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Preface 
Until the end of the First World War, the Baltic region was understood as 
a geographical area comprising the coastal strip of the Baltic Sea from the 
Gulf of Danzig to the Gulf of Finland. In the years between the two World 
Wars the concept became more political in nature: after Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania obtained their independence in 1918 the region gradually 
became understood as the geographical entity made up of these three 
republics. 
Although the Baltic region is geographically fairly homogeneous, 
each of the newly restored republics possesses unique geographical and 
strategic features. Even their military significance is different when 
measured against that of their neighbours. In order that these difference 
should be better understood, this study looks not only at the Baltic region 
as a whole but at the three states separately - their strategic factors, their 
potential for arranging their national defence and their strategic concepts, 
although these have not yetbeen approved by the respective parliaments. 
The northern part of what was once East Prussia, and now is the 
Königsberg/Kaliningrad administrative region, is geographically a part 
of the Baltic region. Housing as it does a large Russian military base, it is 
also of great strategic significance, not only to Lithuania but to Latvia and 
Estonia. For this reason it, too, is included in the survey. 
The materials for the research were collected during the years 1991-
1994. Besides the many published sources, the study also relies on oral 
and unpublished material gathered in numerous fact-finding trips to 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Helsinki, 30 June 1994. 
Erkki Nordberg 
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1 STRATEGIC COLONIES 
In Pursuit of Economic Gain 
Between 1198 and 1945, wars were waged in the Baltic region for 
a total of 173 years. Overall, the ratio of years of war to years of 
peace was 1:4.4. Of the eight most important wars, the Germans 
and Swedes initiated six and the Russians and the French one 
each. (STRODS 1991, 3) 
In these wars, the Slays [Russia and Poland] were four 
times victorious and the Teutons [Germans and Swedes] three 
times. As a consequence of the wars, others came to dominate 
the northern parts of the Baltic region militarily: German feudal 
lords for 351 years, Poles for 61, Swedes for 121 and Russians for 
217. German economic and cultural influence nevertheless 
prevailed in the region for 700 years. (STRODS 1991, 3) 
Until about 1800 the chief driving force behind the advance 
into the northern parts of the Baltic region was the pursuit of 
economic gain. In the times of the Mediaeval Hanseatic League, 
the major towns of the Baltic region were members of equal 
status within the League and the region formed an important 
stepping stone for the Hanse to eastern markets. With the 
weakening of the League in the early 16th century, the region 
found a prosperity of its own. (ALAJOKI et al. 1991, 31, 33) 
During the first peaceful half of the 16th century that 
followed, the Baltic region became the kind of military political 
vacuum (ALAJOKI et al. 1991, 33) that attracts conquerors. The 
motive of the Livonian war waged in 1558-1583, and of the wars 
that followed, was Russia's need to acquire a stronghold in the 
Baltic Sea and along its coasts (STRODS 1991, 3; VARDYS & 
MISIUNAS 1978b, 4). But also the other countries of the Baltic 
Basin were desirous of gaining advantage in the relatively 
prosperous Baltic region. 
Lt.Col. GSO Erkki Nordberg, MLitt., is the Commander of Uusimaa Jaeger 
Battalion in Helsinki. He was Senior Research Officer at the War College/ 
National Defence College in 1990-1993 and a Visiting Researcher at the Centre 
for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen, in 1989-1990. 
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Russian Troop Concentrations 
The first Russian regiment was garrisoned in Narva during the 
Great Northern War in 1711, and Tallinn and Riga had obtained 
their first Russian regiments by 1740. Divisional Headquarters 
were established in Estonia and Livonia in 1763, and five years 
later an Army Central Depot was set up in Riga (STEIN 1885, 46, 
63, 113, 141, 158). A Russian Governor-General who was 
responsible for the civil administration of the entire Baltic region 
was appointed in Riga in 1801. (THADEN 1984, 97) 
MAP 1: Baltic States 1920-1930 
The opening of the present century saw the northern and eastern 
parts of Estonia attached to the St.Petersburg Military District. 
An Army Corps was headquartered at Tartu with its divisions 
stationed in Tallinn and Pskov. Frontier Guard Brigades were 
based west of Tallinn and in the northern parts of Saaremaa. 
Troops were also garrisoned in the Tallinn fortress. (FROBENIUS 
1901, 746, map Russland) 
Latvia, Lithuania and the southwestern parts of Estonia 
were part of the Vilnius Military District. The most important 
centre was Riga, where an Army Corps Headquarters and two 
divisions were garrisoned. A further division was quartered in 
the Daugavpils fortress. Another fortress town where large 
numbers of troops were garrisoned was Liepaja. (FROBENIUS 
1901, 746, map Russland) 
Lithuania had its share of garrisons as well. An Army 
Corps Headquarters and two divisions were located in and near 
Vilnius. One infantry, one cavalry and one artillery division 
were stationed at Kaunas, and one cavalry and one artillery 
division were quartered in Suwalki. (FROBENIUS 1901, 746, 
map Russland) 
Liepaja, Ventspils and Kronstadt were Russia's main naval 
bases on the Baltic Sea, while Riga and Tallinn, along with Viipuri 
and Suomenlinna, formed the basis of the northwest coastal 
defence. Kaunas was regarded as protecting the flank of the 
Russian northern front, while Daugavpils was expected 
eventually to form a maintenance and depot area for Russia 
(FROBENIUS 1901, 734). The positioning of Russian troops in 
the Baltic states continued, more or less as described, during the 
first decade of the 20th century. (GOTHA 1910,1081-1083) 
The fact that the Baltic states were attached to two different 
military districts underscored, already then, the special military 
status of Estonia's northern and eastern parts relative to the 
other parts of the Baltic region. Estonia, Ingermanland and Petseri 
were bound up with the defence arrangements for St.Petersburg, 
whereas Latvia and Lithuania were more closely linked to the 
strategic entity consisting of East Prussia, Poland and Belarus. 
One cannot fail to notice, either, the huge number of troops 
stationed in Riga at that time, or the importance of Daugavpils as 
a maintenance centre. 
The Sea Fortress of Peter the Great 
The strategic importance of Estonia's north coast for the defence 
of St. Petersburg was made particularly clear when the Sea 
Fortress of Peter the Great was constructed in 1912-1917. The 
inner circle of the defence zone was formed by the Kronstadt 
fortress and by forts on opposite sides of the Gulf, in Finland and 
Ingermanland. The next line was fixed through the islands Someri, 
Lavansaari and Seiskari in the Gulf of Finland. (LEHONKOSKI 
1938, 98) 
MAP 5: Sea Fortress of Peter the Great in October 1917. 
The main defence line of the fortress, however, lay on the line 
Porkkala-Tallinn, and this sea terrain was regarded as the primary 
area of manoeuvre for the Russian navy. Construction work was 
accordingly begun in Tallinn on what was to be the main Russian 
naval base. A third line was formed on the level Orö-Tahkuna, to 
protect the navy when moving from the Turku-Aland archipelago 
to the main line of defence, and when moving from one 
archipelago to another. (LEHONKOSKI 1938, 98) 
Flanking positions were fortified in the Turku-Aland and 
Estonian archipelagos, with the purpose of securing those areas 
as safe havens for the navy and to protect its possible offensive 
operations. A number of detached forts were built between the 
W, 
fortification lines to protect key communities along the coast of 
the Gulf of Finland. (LEHONKOSKI 1938, 99-101) 
The function of the forts built on the larger Estonian islands 
was to block the access to the Gulf of Riga and especially to 
Vainameri where the Russian navy had its forward base. The 
southern passage to the Gulf of Riga is through the Straits of 
Irben, which is just 27 km wide, and could effectively be blocked 
by the batteries at Cape Sääre at the southern tip of Saaremaa. 
(LEHONKOSKI 1938, 101-103) 
National Garrisons 
The strategic importance of a state and its various regions can be 
estimated in some degree by scrutinizing the locations of its 
garrisons. In the case of the Baltic states, which gained their 
independence in 1918, the situation is complicated by their need, 
due to weak economies, initially to rely on former Russian 
garrisons despite their inappropriate location. 
MAP 6: Estonia. 
On the eve of the Second World War, the Divisional Headquarters 
of Estonia were located in Rakvere, Tartu and Tallinn. The troops 
of the 1st [Rakvere] Division were located in Narva, Tapa and 
Jöhvi. The 2nd [Tartu] Division had its contingencies in Valga, 
Vöru and Petseri, and the 3rd [Tallinn] Division garrisoned its 
troops in Tallinn, Viljandi and Pärnu (LIMBERG 1980, 195-207). 
Ground forces had permanent manoeuvring areas in Värska at 
the southwestern corner of Peipsi järv and in Kutna. 
Estonia's anti-aircraft artillery was concentrated in Tallinn 
(LIMBERG 1980, 208), and the three squadrons of Estonia's 
Airforce operated from Tallinn, Tartu and Rakvere air bases 
(JANE'S 1935, 32b). The main naval base was in Tallinn, while 
the staff of the Lake Peipus Fleet-Group were working in Tartu. 
The command posts of the coastal artillery were on the island of 
Aegna, at Cape Viimsi, on Naissaar and at Cape Suurupi. 
(LIMBERG 1980, 209-213) 
Estonian ground forces seem to have been located on the 
principle of maintaining fast deployment forces in the vicinity of 
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the eastern border. Some detached infantry battalions had also 
been established near conscript domiciles to provide the conscripts 
with initial military training. A considerable portion of the defence 
forces, the entire anti-aircraft artillery and all the supplies and 
depots were located in or near Tallinn, to serve as common 
reserves and to maintain public order. 
MAP 7: Latvia. 
Latvia's four divisions were placed in her four provinces, with 
headquarters in Liepaja, Riga, Rezekne and Daugavpils (PASSOW 
1939, 230). The regiments were garrisoned in Liepaja, Jelgava, 
Riga, Plavinas, Aluksene, Jaunaluks, Cesis, Valmiera, Rezekne, 
Krutspils and Daugavpils (SArk 1402/3). Airforce squadrons 
operated from Riga, Spilven, Daugavpils and Kreslava and a 
sea-squadron from Liepaja (JANE'S 1935, 47b; SArk 1402/3). 
Coastal artillery was concentrated in Daugavgriva at the mouth 
of the Daugava River (SArk 1402/3). As in Estonia, the peacetime 
grouping of Latvia's ground forces was heavily concentrated in 
and around the capital. Kurzeme (Courland) had been left to 
depend on the Liepaja garrison, as was also the case in western 
Zemgale where the one and only contingent was stationed in 
Jelgava. The other garrisons, placed in and around strategic points 
and crossroads, were clearly located with the intention of 
repulsing invasions from the east and northeast. 
The reason for grouping the fixed coastal artillery so that it 
could only protect the capital may have been scarce resources. 
However, another reason could have been that Estonia's coastal 
and naval defence capabilities to the north were regarded as 
inadequate. It is worth noting that at Cape Irben there was no 
fixed coastal artillery at all, capable of blocking the access to the 
Gulf of Riga from the open sea. 
MAP 8: Lithuania. 
Lithuania's divisional headquarters were located at 
Panevezys, Kaunas and Siauliai (PASSOW 1939, 180). The 1st 
Division was garrisoned in Panevezys, Ukmerge and Kupiskis; 
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the 2nd in Kaunas and its surroundings, Prienai, Marijampole, 
Vilkaviskis, Seredzius, Kediniai and Raseiniai; and the 3rd in 
Siauliai, Radvisiskis, Taurage, Zemaiciu, Varniai, Plunge and 
Klaipeda. The Cavalry Regiment was trained in Alytus. (SArk 
1402/6) 
The airforce had bases in Kaunas, Siauliai, Klaipeda, Palanga 
and Schwali (JANE'S 1935, 47b). Lithuania's only port was 
Klaipeda. 
The grouping of Lithuania's ground forces was primarily 
aimed at protecting Kaunas, the capital. Otherwise, the peacetime 
deployment was rather different from that of Estonia and Latvia. 
In Lithuania, more troops had been concentrated and 
infrastructure built with a view to blocking an invasion from 
East Prussia. Lithuanians calculated that such an invasion would 
be directed mainly towards Kaunas but possibly also towards 
Siauliai. There was practically no military presence at all along 
Lithuania's eastern border with Poland. 
As a general conclusion it could be said that all the 
independent Baltic states had deployed their main garrisons in 
big cities and near by strategic crossroads. The groupings could 
be regarded as tailored according to the respective threat 
scenarios. In Estonia, the troops were concentrated in the east, in 
the directions of Narva and Pskov. Latvia and Lithuania had to 
take into account the threat of invasion not only from the Soviet 
Union but from East Prussia and their ground forces were 
accordingly grouped more symmetrically than those of Estonia. 
Bases of Occupation 
Germany and the Soviet Union attacked Poland and divided her 
in autumn 1939. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet Union put pressure 
on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, finally forcing them to conclude 
treaties of mutual assistance with her. The Baltic states were 
forced to cede bases to the Soviet Union and to accept some 20 
000-25 000 Soviet troops on each country's soil. From the locations 
of those bases one can draw some far reaching conclusions about 
the wartime interests of the Soviet Union, or Russia, in the Baltic 
republics. 
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MAP 9: The Soviet Bases in 1940. 
In Estonia, Soviet bases were established in Paldiski, Haapsalu, 
Lihula, Hanila, Hiiumaa, Kuressaar in Saaremaa, Kihlekanna, 
and in Kuusiku and Kehtna some 50 kilometres south of Tallinn. 
In the course of the negotiations the Soviets had also demanded 
Paide and Valga as their garrisons (WARMA 1973, 83-85; 
MYLLYNIEMI 1977, 69; KRONLUND 1991, Map 10, 170). Air 
bases were set up at Klooga and Laokula near Paldiski, at Sinilepa 
near Haapsalu, at Kuressaar in Saaremaa, and at Kehtna and 
Kuusiku. (LAASI 1993, 51) 
The reasons for establishing bases in just the places seem to 
have been firstly the intention to occupy and secondly the concern 
with naval and coastal defence, which would require blocking 
the mouths of the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf. of Riga. Later on, 
during the Finnish Winter War in 1940, the airbases were used in 
bombing raids against Finnish cities. (WARMA 1973, 83) 
In Latvia, Soviet naval bases were established in Ventspils 
and Liepaja, with Liepaja later to become the main base of the 
submarine fleet. Coastal artillery bases were set up in Mikeltorns 
and Pitrags at Cape Irben. A third concentration of Soviet troops 
was placed near by the Lithuanian border, with garrisons in 
Priekule, Ezere, Auce and Basi. The headquarters of the occupying 
force was located in Liepaja. It is also possible that aeroplanes 
and tanks were stored in Latvia. (MYLLYNIEMI 1977, 71-72; 
SUVOROV 1990, 132; KRONLUND 1991, Map 10, 170) 
In Latvia as in Estonia, Soviet military interests seem to 
have focused on naval and coastal defences. Concentrations in 
Latvia's southwestern parts indicate that the Soviets were 
preparing either to repulse an attack directed from East Prussia 
towards Riga or to carry out their own attack from Latvia to East 
Prussia. An interesting point is that Riga was not mentioned in 
the negotiations for bases, even though it was an old Russian 
garrison and administrative centre. Not requesting it may have 
been a ploy to create the impression that the bases were intended 
to serve a purely military purpose only. 
In Lithuania the headquarters of the occupation force was 
set up in Nauja-Vielka, some 40 kilometres east of Vilnius, while 
only an airbase was established at the erstwhile capital itself. 
Other garrisons with infantry, cavalry and field artillery 
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contingencies were located in Alytus and Prienai, south of Kaunas. 
The main part of the tank troops, and an airbase, were grouped 
in Gaiziunai, northeast of Kaunas. (MYLLYNIEMI 1977, 75; 
KRONLUND 1991, Map 10, 170) 
In Lithuania the bases were deployed mainly around the 
capital, a different practice than was observed in Estonia and 
Latvia. From the strategic point of view, the bases give the 
impression that they were intended as the foundation of a military 
infrastructure aimed either at blocking an invasion from East 
Prussia in the direction of White Russia or facilitating a Soviet 
attack on East Prussia. 
At the start of the negotiations for bases the Soviets had 
also demanded that troops and garrisons should be placed inside 
Kaunas as well as in Siauliai and Panevezys (MYLLYNIEMI 
1977, 75). These demands could also be considered reasonable on 
military grounds. 
14 
2 DEFENCE LINES AND 
ATTACK ARROWS 
The Baltic region was turned into a battlefield in both World 
Wars and, from those wartime operations, certain conclusions 
can be drawn on the geostrategic position of the Baltic region 
and the possibilities to exploit it. In this respect the defence plans 
outlined by the Baltic states in the 1920's and 1930's are also of 
some interest. However, one must bear in mind that, although 
the terrain has not changed much, war machines and their 
technology, especially helicopters and missiles, have since then 
altered the nature of war-fighting dramatically. 
Fighting Trenches 
In World War I, the Baltic region did not become a battlefield 
until spring 1915, when the Germans launched a surprise flanking 
operation to Kurzeme by advancing around the Zemaiciu upland 
from the east. Russian defence lines were consolidated on the 
level Dubysa River-Siauliai-Mazeikiai-Aizpute, and from there 
to the coast of the Baltic Sea. (VOLKMANN 1932, 68, Map 2, 
Sketch a) 
MAP 10: German Attack in 1915. 
The Germans resumed their operation in the summer, first along 
the central Lithuanian lowland and later on in the autumn to 
Vilnius and across the Baltic upland to the Norocz lakes. That 
forced the Russians to straighten out their lines along the Daugava 
River and south of Riga up to the head of the Gulf of Riga. 
Russian defence was consolidated at this level until autumn 
1917, (VOLKMANN 1932, Map 2, Sketch a; GENERALSTABEN 
1915, Rapport 124, 8.10.1915; GENERALSTABEN 1918, Rapport 
355a) 
The German attack gathered momentum again in 
September 1917 as the Germans crossed the Daugava River at 
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Jekabpils. Riga was captured in an attack from the east 
(VOLKMANN 1932, 139). Saaremaa and Hiiumaa were seized 
by a division-size amphibious operation that was launched from 
Liepaja in the middle of October 1917 (VOLKMANN 1932, 140). 
Until the end of 1917, frontlines ran on the north side of the 
Daugava River and along the Gauja [Aa] River and in the straits 
separating the large Estonian islands from the mainland. 
(GENERALSTABEN 1918, Rapport 355a). 
In February 1918 the Germans continued their attack once 
more. The frontline was finally consolidated, in March, along the 
waterway running from the Narva River to lakes Peipus and 
Pskov (GENERALSTABEN 1918, Rapport 355a, 359, 361, 381). 
This borderline, separating two religions and cultures, was later 
to become the main defence line of independent Estonia. 
The lack of troops forced the Germans to use only the two 
natural axes of advance leading from northern East Prussia to 
the Baltic region. The operations were clearly directed towards 
the east, with the invasion of Kurzeme only a side operation. 
Within the Baltic region, the main target was Riga with its great 
strategic significance. 
As to the defending Russians, the repulsing of German 
attacks was concentrated on the banks of the major rivers. The 
broad Daugava played an especially key role in the Russian 
defence. One interesting point in this connection is that the 
Daugava was crossed at Jekabpils, at the same spot it was crossed 
in World War II. 
Defence Positions 
Between the two World Wars, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
expected the most lethal threat to come from the east. This threat 
was considered so overwhelming in Estonia that military 
personnel declined to take part with the Latvians in the 
operational planning needed to prepare for a possible German 
onslaught from East Prussia. On the other hand, even Latvia 
viewed the East Prussia option as only a remote possibility. For 
her part, Lithuania was the neighbour of East Prussia and 
surrounded by Poland in the east, a state of affairs that forced 
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her to take seriously both the western and eastern threats. 
(ANDERSON 1978, 133; PETERSONS 1991b, 2) 
MAP 11: Baltic Defence Lines in the 1930's. 
Estonia's main defence line ran through the forest and 
swamp areas east of the Narva River, along the river itself and 
through lakes Peipus and Pskov. In the southeastern corner of 
the country the line ran on the level of the Piusa River and the 
town Petseri. Another, rear defence line was established around 
Tallinn and on Estonia's larger islands. Closest to the border, the 
defence line was fortified with some 50 bunkers made of 
reinforced concrete. (ANDERSON 1978, 133-134) 
The plan for the Gulf of Finland was to lay minefields 
around Suursaari, Tytärsaari and Lavansaari as well as on the 
Aegna Porkkala line (ANDERSON 1978, 133-134). In the 1930's, 
Finnish and Estonian military personnel had also made plans for 
common barrage fire and submarine attacks that would lock the 
Soviet Baltic Navy into the shallow end of the Gulf of Finland. 
(LESKINEN 1994 16-19) 
Latvia had three defence plans. The A-plan was to go into 
effect in the event of a Soviet invasion, the D-plan in the event of 
a German invasion, and the K-plan in the event of an invasion 
from both sides. The A-plan presupposed cooperation with 
Estonia and the D-plan cooperation with Lithuania. The K-plan 
was not seriously prepared at all. (ANDERSON 1978, 134; 
PETERSONS 1991b, 2) 
The A-plan was Latvia's main defence concept. Fast 
deployment forces would delay the attacker in the advantageous 
wooded uplands of eastern Latvia to secure mobilization. The 
main defence line was to be based on the Pedeze River, Lake 
Lubans and the Aiviekste River. If forced by a superior attacker, 
withdrawal was to continue to the Daugava River. (ANDERSON 
1978, 134; PETERSONS 1991a, 17; PETERSONS 1991b, 2) 
The Daugava was also the main line of resistance in the D-
plan prepared to block a German attack. In this scenario battles 
were to begin in the Kurzeme upland and along the Venta River 
running through the upland (PETERSONS 1991a, 17). The 
fairways to Riga, Liepaja and Ventspils would be blocked and 
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some army units deployed in coastal defence. Neither the eastern 
nor the Daugava line were fortified. (ANDERSON 1978,134) 
Lithuania had two defence plans. The first was prepared in 
the event of a Polish or Soviet invasion from the east. In this plan 
the fast deployment forces would retreat fighting, from the 
frontiers to Kaunas and the Nevesis River. If necessary, 
withdrawal would have been continued to the Dubysa River, 
which had been fortified with reinforced concrete bunkers. 
(ANDERSON 1978, 134; PETERSONS 1991a, 17) 
Anoher plan was prepared to stop an attack by Germany 
from East Prussia. Here the aim was to retreat from the frontier 
to the Dubysa River, which in this alternative formed the main 
line of resistance. (ANDERSON 1978, 134; PETERSONS 1991a, 
17) 
The Estonian and Latvian, and to a certain extent also the 
Lithuanian forward defences, formed more or less contiguous 
defence arrangements in the east. A separate and too early retreat 
by one of the countries would have caused a gap in the defence 
of the others. In spite of this, the Baltic states had neither 
coordinated defence plans nor coordinated defence arrangements. 
Western and Soviet analysts thus placed no value at all on the 
defence cooperation of the Baltic states. (ANDERSON 1978,134-
135) 
The republics had nevertheless to some degree cooperated 
in security matters in the 1920's and 1930's. Estonia and Latvia 
had concluded a military-political alliance as early as 7 July, 
1921, and in 1931 their defence forces had organized an integrated 
field manoeuvre. On 12 September 1934, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation for ten 
years. The military cooperation between Estonia and Latvia was 
terminated in summer 1937, after which the Estonian General 
Headquarters prepared a new mobilization plan. (ANDERSON 
1978, 133) 
In all, properly working together, the Baltic states could 
have mounted a considerable territorial defence. Defence 
spendings were about one quarter of each government's annual 
budget. (ANDERSON 1978,129). In practice, the republics would 
have been able to mobilize some 360 000 troops in 72 hours. 
Estonia could equip four divisions, Latvia eight and Lithuania 
six. (PETERSONS 1991b, 1; ANDERSON 1978, 129-130) 
The naval forces of the republics consisted of four 
submarines, one torpedo boat, eight gun boats, six mine layers 
and one parent ship for submarines. The Estonian Air Force had 
virtually no fighters, but Latvia had 29 and Lithuania as many as 
90. (PETERSONS 1991b, 1-2; ANDERSON 1978, 129) 
Attack Arrows 
The Soviet plan to conquer the Baltic states, prepared in 1940, 
provides a good insight into how the republics might be invaded 
from the east. It was intended that the operation would be 
executed by the troops of Leningrad and the White Russia Military 
Districts (PETERSONS 1991a, 16). As it turned out, there was no 
need to implement the plan at all, because on 15-17 June, 1940, 
strong and fresh Soviet troops were allowed to march into the 
republics by mutual agreement, without a single shot being fired. 
(KUNG 1975, 51) 
MAP 12: Soviet Invasion Plan in 1940. 
Estonia was to have been invaded by two divisions attacking 
along the northeast coast heading for Narva and Kohtla-Järve. 
Two divisions were to make a flanking operation through the 
swampy terrain at the northern end of Lake Peipus, and to head 
south of Rakvere and via Tapa to Kehra. Two more divisions, in 
the south, were to attack from the area of Pskov-Ostrov towards 
Vöru, Tartu and Valga. (PETERSONS 1991a, 17) 
The agreement not withstanding, a Soviet amphibious 
operation was peacefully executed on the Estonian coast on 12-
17 July 1940, as called for in the plan. Forces were equivalent to 
one division. In the course of this operation a reinforced brigade 
was sea-lifted to Paldiski and one brigade-size formation to 
Tallinn from Koivisto, a town on the coast of the Karelian Isthmus. 
Reserves, ready to be sea-lifted to the Bay of Kunda, were massed 
on Suursaari and at the Bay of Suurkylä. (MANNINEN 1992, 
902) 
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The plan called for Latvia to be invaded by two columns. 
Only one division was to be used, attacking the main Latvian 
defence line from the east and heading for Karsava and Rezekne. 
The main attack was intended to capitalize on the lack of defence 
cooperation between Latvia and Lithuania and would have been 
directed towards Riga from the southeast, from Lithuanian 
territory. Riga was also to be attacked from Liepaja on the west 
coast by a force of two divisions. (PETERSONS 1991a, 17) 
The main attack against the Baltic states was to be directed 
against Lithuania with Riga the ultimate target. The invasion of 
two armies, 13 divisions in all, was to be made straight from the 
east, from the soil of Belarus, across the Baltic Uplands and along 
the Lithuanian Central Plains to the bottom of the Gulf of Riga. 
Vilnius and Kaunas were to be captured in a separate operation 
from the southeast, which would have been continued towards 
East Prussia. (PETERSONS 1991a, 17) 
Theconquest of the Baltic states was intended to be 
supported by a special forces' operation carried out in Tallinn, 
Riga and Liepaja and elsewhere. The Straits of Irben between 
Saaremaa and Kurzeme were to be blocked. The main task of the 
airforce would be to bomb Bauska, Jelgava and Riga as a support 
to the main attack. (PETERSONS 1991a, 17) 
Tank Columns 
The German Operation Barbarossa in 1941 provides instruction 
in the reverse procedure: how to use ground forces in a west-to-
east offensive in the Baltic region. Unlike the Soviet attack from 
east to west in 1944, Operation Barbarossa depended on sudden 
advance to the depth of enemy deployment and a disintegrating 
resistance. The later Soviet invasion was targeted at destroying 
the retreating German troops. 
MAP 13: German Attack in 1941. 
In June 1941, the German North Army Group attacked from East 
Prussia to the Soviet Union in three columns. A southern column 
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pushed forward via Kaunas and Vilnius to the Daugava, which 
was crossed between Daugavpils and Polotsk. A central column 
attacked from Tilsit towards Daugavpils and Jekabpils, from 
where it proceeded northeast towards Ostrov and Pskov. 
(TIPPELSKIRCH 1959, 320-321; BAUER 1973a, 545; BOOG et.al. 
1983,5) 
A northern column crossed Lithuania's southwestern 
border and proceeded northeast across the central Lithuanian 
lowland towards the Siauliai and Riga road, and north through 
the Pajurian lowland. After capturing Riga, this operation 
proceeded to Estonia using two axes of advance. The eastern axis 
ran northeast via Valga to Tartu, while the western one was 
directed along the coastal road running to Pärnu. A mop-up 
operation was then directed in several columns up to Estonia's 
north coast.. Saaremaa was invaded from Estonia's west coast 
and Hiiumaa by an attack launched from Saaremaa. (BAUER 
1973a, 545; BOOG et. al. 1983, 9; MADEJA 1988,12-13) 
The German invasion was a breakthrough offensive that 
utilized Lithuanian and Latvian soil as a means to its ultimate 
objectives of Leningrad and Ingermanland. The northern 
operation was a side operation, aimed at protecting the flanks of 
the main attack. 
MAP 14: Conquest of the Baltic Region in 1944. 
Soviet forces began their push-back of the Germans in Estonia, 
where in summer 1944 they established a bridgehead on the 
western bank of the Narva at the northern end of Lake Peipus 
(NOMM 1992, 231). The Germans surrendered their positions at 
the Sinimägi line west of Narva in late summer. By seizing this 
opportunity, the northern flank of the Soviet forces was able to 
proceed rapidly westward along the coastal road and capture 
Tallinn and Paldiski. (TIPPELSKIRCH 1960, 129-131; BAUER 
1973b 110, 343) 
In the northeast, another column then began advancing 
over the swampy terrain at the northern end of Lake Peipus 
towards the southwest to Paide where the column was divided 
into two parts. While the northern part proceeded to Haapsalu 
21 
and captured Muhu and Saaremaa, the southern part was directed 
from Paide, through the Körvemaa Woodlands, to Pärnu. 
(TIPPELSKIRCH 1960, 129-131; BAUER 1973b, 110, 343) 
In the southeast, the northern flank of the Soviet troops 
advanced from the Pskov-Petseri region along the railway 
towards Vöru where the force was divided into two columns. 
The northern column captured Tartu and proceeded north and 
northwest, while the southern one attacked along the Pskov-
Riga road to Valga, continued on to Latvian soil, captured 
Valmiera and rushed to the coast. The southern parts of the 
Soviet troops attacked from Ostrov to Gulbene and proceeded 
on to Riga following the southern side of the Valga-Riga railway 
line. (TIPPELSKIRCH 1960,130-131; BAUER 1973b 110, 343) 
In southern Latvia, Sviet forces advanced towards Riga 
along both sides of the Daugava. The northern column launched 
its attack from the area of Ostrov to Rezekne and followed the 
northern bank of the Daugava on to the capital. The southern 
column attacked from Dzisna to Dugavpils and advanced on 
Riga from the Zemgale lowland. (TIPPELSKIRCH 1960, 130-131; 
BAUER 1973b 110, 343) 
In Lithuania, the Soviet forces used three axes of advance. 
The northern column utilized wooded lands and advanced from 
Utena to Panevesys heading from there partly along the 
Lithuanian Central Lowlands and partly towards the west in the 
direction of Siauliai. Kaunas and Vilnius were captured by attacks 
directed from the south and southeast. The attack was then 
continued towards the southwest. (TIPPELSKIRCH 1960, 130; 
BAUER 1973b, 110) 
The northern parts of Zemgale were taken in offensives 
made in the direction of Siauliai-Telsiai. Klaipeda was captured 
in an assault straight from the east, and the Nemunas River was 
taken in an attack from the northeast and around the northern 
flanks of Raseiniai. (TIPPELSKIRCH 1960, 131) 
The aim of the Soviet operation in 1944 was to defeat the 
German forces and seize the region. The operation depended on 
marked troop superiority, which allowed heavy forces to be 
deployed in all necessary directions. The operation was no 
surprise to the Germans as fronts were in motion everywhere. 
Although the situation differed from that prevailing in the region 
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in 1940, the operation nevertheless began according to the plan 
that had been drawn up in that year. 
Axes of Advance and Intrinsic Value 
Estonia's geographical location as a coastal state on the Gulf of 
Finland was particularly irritating to the Soviet Union. The unique 
strategic value of Estonia and her islands had already been 
recognized at the beginning of the century when the Sea Fortress 
of Peter the Great was built. Estonia possessed obvious military 
value as the outer rim of the Leningrad defence zone. 
Conversely, forces deployed in Estonia represented a threat 
to the flank of any invader desiring to use the Baltic states as an 
axis of advance towards Leningrad. The invader would have to 
take that threat into account and eliminate it in a separate 
operation. 
Latvia's strategic importance lay in her southern and 
northeastern parts, and in 1944 also the Pskov-Riga highway, 
which could be used as an axis of advance between East Prussia 
and Leningrad or vice versa. Riga, on the other hand, as the 
central capital of the Baltic states, has always been of value as 
such, while Rezekne and Daugavpils were important crossroads 
and thus locally valuable in the military sense. Kurzeme 
represents to the attacker a threat from the flank that must be 
eliminated. The Daugava possessed defensive value, particularly 
in the First but also in the Second World War. 
Lithuania's strategic importance rests on the attractiveness 
of her soil for offensive actions from Belarus to East Prussia, or 
vice versa. The southeastern parts of Lithuania are a transit area 
and the western parts of the country make a useful axis of advance 
to Kurzeme and Riga. Not surprisingly, Lithuania is the country 
whose soil, more than any other, has been used for invasions 
from one country to another. A look at the Soviet invasion plan 
prepared in 1940 only serves to underscore this. 
Looking at the Baltic region as a whole, it is useful to 
remember that Otto von Bismarck had long ago regarded the 
Nemunas River as the border between Germany and Russia 
(SLAVENAS 1978a, 121). From the Russian perspective, the Baltic 
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region has been a peacetime security zone. Nevertheless, Russia 
was prepared to use it as a concentration and rear depot area 
before the First World War. It is also possible that the Soviet 
Union planned to use the Baltic region as the assembly area for 
an invasion it was planning to launch on East Prussia and 
Germany in 1940-1941. 
As the Germans saw it, the Baltic region was an area 
dominated by Germans for centuries. After Swedish and, later 
on, Russian occupation, it still remained under German cultural 
and economic sway. Militarily, the significance of the Baltic region 
has not been defensive, however. In both World Wars Germany 
used the territories of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in offensive 
operations directed at the capture of St. Petersburg. 
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3 SOVIET OCCUPATION 
The Forest Brethren 
Not all citizens of the Baltic states submitted quietly to the Soviet 
command that was reestablished in the republics; many entered 
into armed resistance. During the peak periods of resistance 
probably 0.5-1.0 per cent of citizens fought in its ranks: some 10 
000 Estonians, 10 000-15 000 Latvians and about 30 000 
Lithuanians. It is estimated that in 1945-1952 perhaps 100 000 
people took part in the activities of the Forest Brethren. 
(MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA 1983, 81, 84) 
The resistance fighters initially armed themselves with 
abandoned German weapons. Later on weapons were captured 
from Soviet soldiers in skirmishes and ambushes. The arms caches 
of the movement were evidently sufficient, but ammunition was 
badly lacking. The Brethren remained in hiding on their farms or 
lived in dug-outs concealed in the vast forests. Clothing and 
food were adequately provided from privately owned farms 
until those were collectivized. (MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA 1983, 
84) 
The resistance movement was best organized in Lithuania 
where a central organization, The United Democratic Resistant 
Movement, existed. In summer 1947, even a 17-day officers course 
was arranged, in which some 72 men were trained. The Lithuanian 
resistance movement was well organized because the leadership 
was in the hands of former professional officers. (MISIUNAS & 
TAAGEPERA 1983, 84-85) 
The Estonian and Latvian Forest Brethren, in contrast, were 
unable to organize any nation-wide leadership. Although only 
under local command, operational groups nevertheless existed 
in all Estonian and Latvian provinces. The Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian movements worked virtually independently of one 
another and of foreign countries. (MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA 
1983, 85-87) 
Armed operations were mostly skirmishes and ambushes 
aimed at keeping the forces of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior 
25 
on the defensive. Some major attacks were launched, in Tartu in 
1945, Kilingi-Nömme in 1946 and Okte in Kurzeme in 1950. 
Additionally, Lithuanians fought six major battles during a 13-
month period in 1945-1946. Other resistance activities of those 
times were the boycotting of elections, paralysing of the work of 
local Soviets, warning of deportations and acting against 
Communist collaborators. (MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA 1983, 
86-87, 90) 
The Forest Brethren lost much of their operational strength 
in 1948-1949 when deportations intensified and the 
collectivization of farmland dried up food and clothing supplies. 
Activities had largely ceased by about 1950. In Latvia scattered 
battles continued until 1950 and in Estonia until 1953. Lithuanians 
changed their resistance from active to passive in 1952. However, 
some individuals remained in hiding for as long as two decades. 
The last Estonian fighter drowned himself in 1978 while trying to 
evade capture. (MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA 1983, 90-91; 
LINDSTEDT 1992a, 23) 
The successfulness and long duration of armed activities 
demonstrate that the terrain and self-sufficiency in food 
production make it possible to carry on guerilla type operations 
in all the Baltic countries. Another conclusion is that centralized 
command and coordination enhanced the efficiency of activities 
in Lithuania. Thirdly, one can conjecture that cooperation between 
the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian Forest Brethren would at 
least have strengthened intelligence and thereby all activities. 
National Divisions 
After the take-over in 1945, the Soviet Army organized national 
divisions in the Baltic republics, providing young male citizens 
the opportunity to do their national service at home. The higher 
command of the Estonian division was first composed of 'Russian 
Estonians', among whom there were Communists and even 
persons who had no command of the Estonian language. Later 
on, both the Estonian and Latvian divisions recruited some true 
national officers. (ARJAKAS 1992, 243; VIDRIUSKAS 1991) 
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MAP 6: Estonia 
The headquarters, 1st Infantry Regiment [IR] and branch units of 
the Estonian National Division were situated in Tallinn, the 2nd 
IR was in Jägala, the 3rd IR in Jöhvi, a Tank Regiment in Keila 
and an Engineer Battalion in Narva (SINIMAGI 1992). The 
Division was expected to establish an Army Corps in wartime 
which would be responsible for coastal defence. 
The Soviet forces in Estonia consisted of one motorized 
infantry division in Tallin, another in Klooga, two field artillery 
regiments in Viljandi and one engineer regiment in Pärnu. 
(SINIMAGI 1991) 
After the 20th Party Congress of the Commnist Party of the 
Soviet Union, some kind of mutiny took place in the Georgian 
national division. Therefore, all the national divisions were 
suppressed in March 1956 and the troops were organized on 
universal basis. (SINIMAGI 1991) 
Air Defence Zone 
By 1990, the Soviet infantry stationed in Estonia had diminished 
to only one motorized division, with its garrisons located in 
Tallinn, Klooga and Keila. Other Soviet army units were a BC-
warfare regiment in Pärnu and an engineer regiment in Tapa. 
(OVERBEFALHAVAREN [OB] 1992, 2, Appendix 1) According 
to some sources, also a small unit of marines may have been 
stationed in Tallinn. (HUITFELDT 1991, 33; RISLAKKI 1992b) 
Interceptor regiments of the Leningrad Air Defence Army 
operated in Estonia from Haapsalu, Pärnu and Tapa airbases. At 
one time Tapa was also a base for a helicopter unit (OB 1992, 8). 
The Tartu airbase was used by one of the Smolensk Air Army's 
strategic bomb regiments and a transport regiment (OB 1992, 8; 
SEPPALA 1991). Some ten kilometres outside the base was a 
nuclear bomb storage. 
Surface-to-air missile [SAM] brigades were deployed in 
Kuressaar, Keilajoe, Rakvere and Valga. Six air-warning radar 
stations controlling the northern airspace were installed along 
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the coast of the Gulf of Finland. The area of responsibility of the 
Estonian Air Defence Division extended to the Suursaari-Kiviöli-
Rannapungerja line in the east, while the Leningrad Air Defence 
Division covered the airspace east of that line. (LINDSTEDT 
1992c, 18) 
The Tallinn minesweeper base was the main naval base of 
the Soviet Baltic Fleet in Estonia. The Paldiski missile boat base 
was protected by an anti-aircraft missile battery, and it also 
concealed an immense training complex for Soviet submarine 
crews (OB 1992,6). Inside the centre there were two training 
simulators with their nuclear reactors, one for Delta I-III and the 
other for Typhoon-type submarines (LAANEOTS 1992). Navy 
Air Force wings used the Amäri-Vasalemma air base. (OB 1992, 
6) 
The Soviet military units and their deployment in Estonia 
give the impression that, in the Soviet view, Estonia was an 
extension of the Leningrad air defence zone and critical to securing 
the mouth of the Gulf of Finland. The relatively weak ground 
forces were most probably intended to defend the Estonian coast 
and her larger islands. 
The construction of air warning radar stations along 
Estonia's northern coast indicates that the Soviet Union did not 
trust Finland's capabilities to prevent the use of her airspace for 
air raids against the Tartu air base. The air defence division 
deployed in Ingermanland to defend Estonia's northeastern 
airspace may in reality have been intended to defend the Soviet 
arms factories located in the area. Another explanation would be 
that the Soviets regarded northeastern Estonia as part of Russian 
Ingermanland rather than Estonia. 
The immense downgrading of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in the 
early 1990's diminished the importance of Paldiski naval base. 
The older nuclear submarine reactor was de-activated in the 
early 1980's and the newer one in 1989 (VAINIO 1992; BORISOV 
1991). The dismantling of both reactors was begun in early 1994 
(ROTKO 1994a), and evidently most Russian military and 
technical personnel will leave Paldiski after the reactors have 
been transported to Russia. 
Strategic Infrastructure 
In Latvia, the Headquarters and HQ-units of the Baltic Military 
District were stationed in Riga. One tank division was garrisoned 
in Dobele, while one regiment of the motorized infantry division 
stationed in Estonia was deployed in Aluksene. (HUITFELDT 
1991,33; OB 1992, Appendix 1; KOSKELA & BERGSTRÖM 1992, 
39) 
MAP 16: Soviet Armed Forces in Latvia in 1992. 
Soviet Air Defence Airforces had their bases in Riga and Vainode. 
Fighter and bomb regiments were operating from Tukums, 
Lielvarde, Jekabpils and Daugavpils air bases. One transport 
regiment was based at Riga and one reconnaissance flight 
regiment at Krutspils (OB 1992, 7-8). Additionally, one Military 
Academy of the Air Defence Air Forces, as well as a radio and 
electronics school, were located at Daugavpils. (GEIBA 1991) 
The immense Soviet Garkalne Depot area was situated at 
Adaz, on both sides of the Riga-Pskov highway some 30 
kilometres northeast of Riga. It evidently contained at least a 
technical depot and a large depot filled with field artillery 
ammunition. Another ammunition depot was situated in Cekule. 
North and northwest of the Garkalne depot area there was a vast 
army training area. (HS 13.7.1992, A3, A22; HS 14.7.1992, Bl) 
Latvia's major ports of Riga, Ventspils and Liepaja, provided 
important naval bases for the Soviet Baltic Fleet (CLEMMESEN 
1990). Liepaja served as the main Soviet submarine base in 1939-
1941 and again from 1945 onwards (SUVOROV 1990, 132; 
SCHULTE 1992), while Bolderaja naval base near Riga was a 
major shipyard. (AL 28.6.1992, 27) 
Latvian straegic objects in the Russian view are the Liepaja 
naval base, the satellite monitoring centre in Ventspils and the 
anti ballistic missile [ABM] Henhouse radar installation in 
Skrunda (RISLAKKI 1992a; HS 10.2.1994, C2). In March 1994, a 
preliminary agreement between Russia and Latvia was reached, 
which permits the radar installation in Skrunda to operate for 
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four years, after which it will be dismantled during one year and 
a half. (VALKONEN 1994a; LINSIO 1994a) 
The deployment of Soviet forces in Latvia confirms the 
interpretation that especially Riga but also Daugavpils held 
strategic significance for the Soviets, and does now for the 
Russians. A tank division was very probably deployed in Dobele, 
and a motorized infantry regiment in Aluksene, in order to secure 
vital traffic connections. This and the fact that there were major 
ammunition stores in Latvia, suggests that Latvia was regarded 
as the rear area of the Baltic Military District. 
Offensive Deployment 
Soviet troops in Lithuania were deployed at about 15 localities 
(TS 15.6.1992, 14). The largest garrisons were in Klaipeda and 
Vilnius, both hosting one motorized infantry division, and at 
Kaunas and Jonava where there were barracks for one parachute 
division. (OB 1992, 4-5) 
MAP 7: Lithuania. 
One divisional mobilization depot was situated in Paprade, one 
engineer regiment in Kaunas, a surface-to-surface missile brigade 
in Telsiai, a signal regiment in Taurage, and a support regiment 
in Kibartai maintaining the gas pipeline to Kaliningrad (OB 1992, 
4-5). Additionally, a large tank and helicopter depot was located 
at Jonava (BANKS 1992b) and a satellite monitoring centre at 
Linksmakalnis. (BANKS 1992) 
Siauliai provided the base for a fighter regiment and an 
electronic warfare regiment. Kedainiai and Panevezys had bases 
for air transport regiments and Kaunas a base for a helicopter 
regiment (OB 1992, 7-8). Mickunai and Alytus had bases for air 
defence forces and Marijampole and Karmelava for air force 
units. (BANKS 1992b) 
A marine regiment garrison was located in Telsiai and a 
large fuel depot in Pagegiai (BANKS 1992b). In addition there 
were Soviet garrisons at Plunge, Ukmerge, Grodkovo, Kalvarija, 
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Prisani and Probrade. Klaipeda was an important garrison with 
one strong division which was renamed as a coastal defence 
division in 1990. (STARR 1990) 
The Soviet forces in Lithuania appear to have been closely 
associated with the army size force based in the Königsberg/ 
Kaliningrad area. That formation was most probably intended to 
form the second column of the former Warsaw Pact forces with 
the mission of attacking to the coasts of the Atlantic Ocean or 
launching an amphibious operation in southern Sweden (THE 
MILITARY BALANCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE [TMBINE] 
1990-1991,18). The two parachute divisions deployed in Lithuania 
add further support to the view that these forces were meant for 
offensive use. 
Russian Strategic Interests 
In the Russian view, former Soviet strategic objects in the now 
independent Baltic republics continue to be important for the 
defence of St. Petersburg, though according to Russia's Minister 
of Defence Pavel GRATSHEV, not irreplaceable after a certain 
transition period (BEAVER 1992). Similar submarine nuclear 
reactors as those at Paldiski exist at the Sosnovyi Bor nuclear 
power plant installation (VAINIO 1992) and in Nizni Novgorod 
[Gorki]. 
The loss of the Liepaja submarine base hampers the activities 
of the Russian Baltic Fleet, even though the fleet is to be 
diminished in size still more (WOFF 1992, C-13). Clearly some 
new base capacity must be built elsewhere, either in the 
Königsberg/Kaliningrad region or at the bottom of the Gulf of 
Finland. (DUDNIK 1992) 
The question of Russia's land connections to and from 
Kaliningrad has been solved. As early as July 1991, Lithuania 
and Russia concluded at least a preliminary agreement on the 
use of land transportation routes and energy supply lines to and 
from the Königsberg/Kaliningrad region. (FT 30.7.1991, 2) 
The one strategic question that remains unresolved is the 
entrance to the Gulf of Finland. As long as the strategic and 
military situation in the Baltic Basin and the Baltic Sea remains 
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quiet there is little reason for concern. If tension were to rise in 
the northern Baltic Sea, however, the question of who controls 
the large Estonian islands and the Aland islands could be of 
considerable importance. 
Fettered Lands 
Close economic ties were forged between Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania and the other Soviet republics during the Soviet era in 
1944-1991. It now looks as though all three republics will be able 
to break most of these ties. The main issues are energy and ethnic 
minorities. 
Before regaining their independence, the Baltic republics 
imported all their oil (KOMAROV 1992) and 90 per cent of the 
energy they consumed from other Soviet republics. Estonia was 
exceptional in obtaining half of her energy from domestic 
resources. (KORHONEN 1991) 
Electricity production was part of the larger, fully integrated 
Soviet system (TKL 1991, 13). For instance, the Ignalina nuclear 
power plant in Lithuania exported electricity to Latvia and Belarus 
(KORHONEN 1991) and earlier also to Kaliningrad. The price of 
energy was also kept artificially low. (TKL 1991, 13) 
The industrial complexes built in the Baltic republics during 
the Soviet era were inefficient, old fashioned, impractical and 
grossly oversized. Enhancing the quality of industrial products 
and widening the assortment to meet western standards will 
require very heavy investment. (KORHONEN 1991; KOMAROV 
1992) 
It is far too early to say anything about the future of 
agriculture. During the Soviet era the Baltic states were an area 
of overproduction and exported large amounts of food to the 
other Soviet republics (TKL 1991, 1-2). The impact of the 
privatization of farmland, and the effects of agriculture and 
customs policies in the Baltic republics and of Russian and 
Western trade policies remain to be seen. From the viewpoint of 
national defence, self-sufficiency in food production is not at a 
bad level. 
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The demographic changes that took place in the Baltic 
states during the Soviet era are of strategic and long-lasting 
importance. The influx of ethnic Russians was encouraged by a 
labour policy which served only the economic and political 
interests of the Soviet Union (GRÖNHOLM 1992). Russian labour 
had to be imported to run the mammoth industrial complexes of 
the Soviet Union. (STRODS 1991b) 
On numerous occasions since 1992, Russian conservatives 
have demanded protection of ethnic Russians living in former 
Soviet republics, by the use of force if necessary (HS 31.7.1992 
C3). Russia has accordingly initiated a scheme to secure the 
privileges of some 25 million ethnic Russians living outside the 
Federation. According to the plan, presented by Russia's Foreign 
Minister Andrei KOZYREV in January 1994, Russia will for 
instance stop energy deliveries to those former Soviet republics 
in which the privileges of ethnic Russians are denied. (IS 19.2.1994, 
A 19) 
According to ColGen I. N. RODIONOV, the Commandant 
of the Russian General Staff Academy (VIGOR & ORR 1992, 4), 
"Russia has fought to acquire free access to the Baltic Sea and the 
Black Sea for centuries. Therefore, the Baltic states should 
guarantee free access for Russia and not allow third parties to 
deploy their troops on their soil. They should also guarantee that 
they will not enter military alliances directed against Russia and 
they should unambiguously guarantee the human rights of ethnic 
Russians living in their countries." 
Russia's foreign policy stance is not easing the situation at 
all. Russia regards former Soviet republics and the Baltic republics 
alike as 'close foreign countries' (KARVONEN 1992; LAHTINEN 
1992) or 'satellite countries" (BANKS 1992b). Another frequently 
heard term is 'small foreign. countries'. (KARVONEN 1992) 
From the military point of view, the continued presence of 
Russian military personnel, and agreements on the military use 
of traffic connections in the Baltic republics, cannot be neglected 
either. The agreement on using Lithuanian roads and railways to 
and from Königsberg/Kaliningrad has already been mentioned. 
Paldiski is still a Soviet city with its 7000 Russian inhabitants, 
and the city council is manned by Russians. It seems clear that 
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Paldiski will remain a Russian enclave and be a sanctuary for 
Russian criminals for a long time to come. (ROTKO 1994b) 
In Latvia, Russians are maintaining their presence by 
keeping and operating the Skrunda ABM site at least until the 
end of the century. Even the new radar installation built at the 
site in the late 1980's is now being equipped with electronics 
(TOOM 1994). This state of affairs suggests Russian military 
wishing to preserve its presence into the future. An operating 
radar station means that Latvia, too, has to submit to Russian 
transit traffic to and from the site. 
From the strategic point of view, energy supplies, ethnic 
and military issues and perhaps reactionary politics could tie the 
Baltic republics to Russia for a considerable time to come. These 
factors, and a Russian de facto presence, also make them vulnerable 
to blackmail. 
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4 ESTONIA: VIRGIN MARY'S LAND 
Estonia's land and freshwater area of 45 215 square kilometres 
makes it a little smaller than Latvia and Lithuania but larger than 
Denmark, Holland and Switzerland. Estonia borders on the Baltic 
Sea in the west and north, Russia in the east and Latvia in the 
south. In 1945 her borders were fixed so that the overall length 
diminished to about 1200 kilometres including some 720 
kilometres sea frontier. (EILART 1989, 46; TBS 1991, 13) 
MAP 6: Estonia. 
Today most of the border with Russia runs along the Narva 
River and across its artifical lake and Lake Peipus [Peipsi järv]. In 
the southeast, the border stretches for 150 kilometres along the 
wooded Haanaja Hills. The 275-kilometre-long southern border 
with Latvia runs mainly in wooded and swampy terrain. 
The Estonian Constitution of 1992 defines the borders as 
those fixed in the Treaty of Tartu in 1920. These borders run 
some 15 kilometres east of the Narva and across Lake Pskov. In 
the Russian interpretation, even Narva and its surroundings are 
ancient Russian territory which was annexed to Estonia only 
after the 1917 Revolution (SINILIND 1985, 21; AL 23.7.1992, 13). 
According to the Law on Russian Borders, only the technical 
marking of borders may be an issue of future negotiation, not 
their general location. (HS 24.2.1993, Cl) 
North of the level Pärnu-Mustvee, the Estonian bedrock is 
slatestone. The thin soil cover increases southwards but not to 
more than some 200 metres (TBS 1991, 14). In southern Estonia 
the bedrock changes to red sandstone, covered in places by as 
much as 600 metres of till and earth. In the north the terrain is flat 
and relatively barren, and in the south more rolling. (EILART 
1989,46-47) The average height above sea-level is about 50 metres. 
The highest point in all of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Mt. 
Munamägi in southeastern Estonia, is only 318 metres above sea 
level. (TBS 1991, 14) 
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Forests cover some 38-40 per cent of the country and mires 
20 per cent (TBS 1991, 14-15; LEET 1992, 41). The southwestern 
parts of the country are flat and swampy although the sandy 
beaches of Pärnu are also found there. A long, relatively thinly 
populated region extends from Kuusalu and Palmse near by the 
north coast down to Pärnu and Kilingi-Nömme. The northern 
parts of this area are covered by the vast forest known as 
Körvemaa [The Wilderness]. (EILART 1989, 48-49) 
West of lake Vörtsjäry [Lake Vorts] are the Sakala Hills, 
and inland from the northwestern shore of Lake Peipus stretches 
the broad and heavily cultivated Pandivere plain. The Otepää 
Hills rise southeast of Vörtsjärv, and the Haanaja Hills in the 
southeastern corner of the country. Eastern and northern Estonia 
are widely covered by sharp sandy ridges and elongated gravel 
formations, or drumlins. The largest drumlin is some ten 
kilometres long and rises to an average height of 144 metres 
above sea-level. Drumlins and lakes are particularly typical north 
of Tartu. (EILART 1989, 48-49, 51) 
Estonia's richest mineral resources are the large oil shale 
and phosphorite deposits located in the northeast (TBS 1991, 14). 
The slag from the mining of the oil shale has been amassed into 
huge hills. These, and the Sinimägi knoll area situated between 
the coast and vast swamps, could provide some defence 
possibilities in this part of the country. From Kuremäe westward 
stretch the vast forests and swamplands that the Forest Brethren 
once used as hide-outs (LINDSTEDT 1992a, 23). The western 
bank of the Narva and the northern coast of Lake Peipus are 
covered with low forest and shrubbery. 
The approximately 1400 lakes cover only 4.5 per cent of the 
total area. Lakes are generally small and shallow, with the notable 
exception of lakes Peipsi and Vörtsjärv. The number of rivers is 
7378. Rivers in the north and west discharge into the Baltic Sea, 
while those of the eastern uplands empty into lakes Peipus and 
Pskov (TBS 1991, 15; EILART 1989, 44). Only the largest and 
swiftest rivers, including the Narva, Emajogi and Pärnu, and 
some narrow but deep river valleys in the northern part of the 
country, possess any value as military obstacles. 
The prevailing winds blow from the west. Climate is 
maritime in the west and continental in the east, with mean 
annual temperatures varying from +6 C in the west to +4.2 - 4.5 
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C in the east. Maximum rainfall is some 500 mm on the coast and 
700 mm in the uplands. Snow usually covers the hills in the 
southeast from December to the end of March, and in hard 
winters the whole country from January to March. During mild 
winters Estonia has no permanent snow cover. (TBS 1991, 14) 
In 1990 Tallinn had a population of 484 400. Other major 
cities were Tartu [115 400], Narva [82 300], Kohtla-Järve [76 800], 
Pärnu [54 200], Sillamäe [20 700] and Rakvere [20 100]. The 
remaining 27 cities were administratively subordinated to the 16 
provinces [maakond]. The local administrative unit is the 
municipality [vald]. (TBS 1991, 13) 
Traffic Routes to be Repaired 
The total length of Estonia's road network is 14 800 kilometres. 
Main roads generally run from north to south but a few also 
from northwest to southeast and from northeast to southwest. 
The Tallinn-Narva highway M 11 is the only major west-east 
road. Construction work has been done to improve it to the 
status of motorway (IS 12.9.1991, A10). The Tallinn-Pärnu-Ikla 
highway will form the northern section of the Via Baltica, which 
is planned to run from north to south throughout the Baltic 
republics. Estonian's main roads are surfaced and comparatively 
broad. The smaller roads tend to be in poor condition. 
The Tallinn-Narva highway, the only highway running into 
Russia in the northeast, crosses the Narva by the Castle of Narva. 
The road network from the level of Kohtia-Järve-Rannapungerja 
eastward is quite sparse. In the southeast, around Petseri, some 
ten small roads cross the Estonian-Russian border, while in the 
south the Estonian-Latvian border is crossed by some 30 roads. 
Estonia's railway network is 1000 kilometres long. The 
gauge is 1524 mm, the same as in Russia. Some steps have been 
taken to double track the Tallinn-Narva-St. Petersburg section 
(IS 12.9.1991, A10); all other railway lines are single tracked. The 
Tartu-Petseri railway is connected to the Russian railway network 
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and the Tartu-Valga railway to the Latvian network. Likewise 
the Tallin-Pärnu railway joins the Latvian system at Laatre. The 
condition of the Estonian railways is poor. 
In 1939 there were some 26 harbours along the Estonian 
coast. At present, the main seaports are Tallinn, Paldiski, Haapsalu 
and Pärnu. Their annual handling capacity is 7 million tonnes of 
freight, which once used to represent some 2 per cent of the total 
capacity of the Soviet Union. Tallinn harbour is able to handle 18 
000 tonnes of grain per day (HS 27.10. 1991, B6; TETT 1991). 
Smaller harbours and anchorages, some 15 along the Baltic Sea 
coast and two on Lake Peipus (EESTI MAANTEED 1990; TEEDE 
JA TURISMIKART 1990), can be used by smaller boats and 
amphibious vessels. 
Durig the Soviet era, only the Rommansaari port in 
Saaremaa was able to unload significant amounts of fuel. Estonian 
Transoil opened a new oil terminal at Muuga near Tallinn in 
early 1993. Storage capacity was initially 4000 cubic metres but 
there is room for an increase in capacity up to 100 000 cubic 
metres. (HS 24.3.1993, B8) 
Estonia's main airports are at Tallinn, Tartu and Pärnu. 
Pärnu was used by both Soviet airforce and civilian traffic, while 
Tartu airbase, which is one of the largest in Europe, was solely a 
military base. Various aviation activities have also been carried 
on from Tapa, Vasalemma, Hapsalu, Vääna-Joesuu, Paldiski, 
Lihula, Valga, Vöru, Mustjöe, Viljandi, Vöhma, Koigi-Nurmsi, 
Adavere, Kunda, Kohtla-Järve and Kuusiku airfields, as well as 
from two air bases in Saaremaa (SINILIND 1985, 100, 102-103). 
The condition of the military airports is generally not good. 
During the Soviet era there were some 350 000 telephones 
in Estonia and the state of communications was fairly good, 
relative to the rest of the Soviet Union (RAUDSEPP 1992). Traffic 
within the country was based on the star network, with calls 
between the provinces being routed through the Tallinn telephone 
exchange. Additionally, some direct lines were provided between 
adjacent provinces (GEUST 1992). From 1992 onwards, a mobile 
phone network has been available for internal calls. (TS 2.7.1992, 
8) 
A Finnish-Swedish-Estonian joint venture, AS Eesti Telefon, 
has plans to set up 270 000 modern digital telephone connections 
in the country in the next 10 years. Large cities and enterprises 
will be the first priority. Tallinn, where a modern digital city 
exchange has already been installed, will have more than half of 
the new telecommunications capacity. (JOKELA 1992a) 
In December 1992 a new fibreoptic cable connection was 
commissioned between Helsinki and Tallinn, making it possible 
to increase transmission capacity almost without limit. Later on, 
the same cable will be used to connect Latvia (RAUDSEPP 1992) 
to the international telecommunications network via Helsinki 
and Stockholm. The cable will also form an essential part of the 
wider international network planned to cover the whole Baltic 
Basin. (JOKELA 1992b) 
A Finnish 1800-channel analogue link, a 960-channel digital 
link and a reserve underwater copper cable provide additional 
communication lines between Tallinn and Helsinki (RAUDSEPP 
1992). Telephone calls can also be made to Helsinki through the 
NMT-450 mobile phone network operating in Tallinn (TKL 1991, 
8). Telecommunications from Estonia to CIS countries continue 
to go via Moscow. (GEUST 1992) 
Widened Territorial Waters 
Estonia's coastline is 3789 kilometres long. In the north, at Paldiski, 
the Gulf of Finland is a mere 50 kilometres wide. The straits 
between the mainland and the large Estonian islands usually 
freeze over in mid-January, for three months, but the Gulf of 
Riga freezes only in the harshest winters. The coast westward 
from Kunda is broken with capes and bays; and the few islands 
and rocky islets are increasing in number with the continued 
rising of the land (TBS 1991,14). The islands of Kihnu and Ruhnu 
in the Gulf of Riga belong to Estonia. 
MAP 6: Estonia. 
Estonia has set its territorial waters at 12 nautical miles [nm], but 
in the Gulf of Finland the waters do not in practice exceed 9 nm, 
and narrow down to as little as 3.6 nm by Kerinsaari. Territorial 
waters and the free passage at the narrowest point of the Gulf of 
Finland thus remain as in the Soviet era. (ROTKO 1993a) 
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On the west coast, the widened territorial waters could 
bring potential oil and gas deposits into the hands of Estonia. 
They also close the Gulf of Riga to uncontrolled navigation and 
push this elsewhere, farther from the coast (HS 19.12.1992, A2). It 
needs to be added that, when it comes to surveillance and control 
of the territorial waters and arranging sea-rescue operations, the 
possession of wide territorial waters poses a problem for a country 
such as Estonia with only limited resources. 
In geneal, the sea-bed drops down to 10 metres about 1 to 2 
kilometres from the coast. The mean water depth is also more 
than ten metres in the middle of the gulfs, with the exception of 
the Gulf of Paldiski, Kurksisalmi and Vainameri where it is only 
six metres. The maximum depth of the Gulf of Riga is 46 metres. 
(LOVIISA 1982; HANKO-LOVIISA 1982; POHJOIS-ITAMERI 
1982) 
Waves in the sea normally do not exceed one metre in 
height, or in storms more than six metres. On the west coast the 
salinity of the water is 5-7 per mille. Coastal waters are heavily 
contaminated in places, especially outside Sillamäe and Kohtla-
Järve and in the Gulf of Riga. (TBS 1991; TIMONEN 1993) 
Along the Gulf of Narva the road network by and large 
follows the coastline with only a few roads running inland. 
Between the Bay of Kunda and Tallinn a dense road network 
stretches to the seashore. To the west and southwest of Tallinn, 
the main roads run parallel to the coast and the roads inland 
from the coast begin at the heads of the capes. 
South of Haapsalu, the coastal road network becomes quite 
dense. Along the Bay of Pärnu and along the coast south of 
Pärnu, the main road runs parallel to the coast. The shore road 
along the east side of Lake Peipus runs from Vasknarva almost 
down to Emajogi. From the northern shore of the lake the road 
network is directed towards Kohtia-Järve and Rakvere, and from 
Mustvee towards Tartu. 
Ethnic Problems 
According to the 1989 census, Estonia has a population of 1 565 
662, of which 1 126 900 dwell in urban centres. The average 
density of population is 35 inhabitants per square kilometre. 
Births in 1988, as in 1977, numbered about 25 100. By 1990, 
however, the number had dropped below 23 000 and in 1993 to 
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only 15 000. In the 1980's the rate of abortions was 120-140 per 
100 births. (TBS 1991, 13, 16; MANNILA 1994) 
Of the total population in 1989, altogether 963 269 
individuals [61.5 per cent] were Estonians, while Russians 
numbered 474 815 [30.3 per cent], Ukranians 48 273 and 
Belarussians 27 711. The Russian minority lived mainly in Tallinn 
and northeastern Estonia. In Tallinn 53.2 per cent of the population 
were Russians, while in Southeast Estonia they formed an 
overwhelming majority of more than 90 per cent. (HS 16.11.1991, 
C3; TBS 1991, 16) 
By early 1994 the number of Russians had diminished by 
some 80 000. However, among the more than 400 000 still living 
in Estonia there are some 11 000 ex Soviet officers and their 30 
000 relatives. Many of the officers possess weapons. (LOUENIVA 
1994b) 
After the restoration of independence, Estonian citizenship 
was granted to all those who had lived in the country before the 
occupation and to their descendants. Citizenship may also be 
granted to persons who have lived in the country since 1990 for 
at least two years (HS 26.11.1992, C3). The applicant has, however, 
to demonstrate a passable command of the Estonian language. 
(VASARA 1993) 
Ethnic Russians are in no way a homogeneous group. For 
instance, Russians who have received Estonian citizenship, some 
30 000 in all, have established a society to attend to their interests, 
and at the first meeting conservative Russians held a protest 
demonstration outside the conference hall (HS 31.1.1993, Cl). 
Additionally, in Narva one formation of the Estonian Civil Guard 
[Kaitseliit] is composed of ethnic Russians. (HELME 1993) 
The large Russian minority nevertheless constitutes a 
security risk to Estonia, in the short run at least. An industrial 
action in the oil shale pits and power plants of northeastern 
Estonia would shut down the economy (EELRAND 1992). The 
workers' guards attached to the ethnic Russian Inter-movement, 
(GRÖNHOLM 1992; DEMARI 16.1.1991, 15; IS 19.1.1991, A20), 
are thought to be still active though operating undercover. Armed 
activists are estimated to number some 30-40 in Narva and some 
100 elsewhere in Estonia, while Russian national radical circles 
claim numbers exceeding 1800. (SARASMO 1992a; IL 27.8.1991, 
13) 
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The one million ethnic Estonians produce some 6000 to 
7000 boys in an age cohort. If some 80-90 per cent of these were to 
be trained in military service the number of reserves would 
increase by at least 5000 men annually. The size of the Finnish 
Field Army is some 530 000, ten per cent of the population. With 
calculations based on the Finnish example, and training over a 
period of 20 years, Estonia could establish a wartime defence 
force of 100 000 men. A field army of that size could easily 
establish an efficient territorial defence covering the whole 
country. 
Problematic Northeastern Corner 
From the viewpoint of Estonian defence, the major strategic 
object of the country is Tallinn with its harbours and airport. 
These could easily be captured by an air assault raid. The 
northeastern parts of the country are mostly inhabited by Russians 
and valuable to Estonia industrially. Rakvere and Tapa are vital 
crossroads further to the west. Other objects of strategic 
importance are the cities and airports of Tartu and Pärnu, the 
airfield of Amäri, the harbour of Paldiski and the large Estonian 
islands. 
The north coast is vulnerable to landing operations 
especially between Narvajoesuu and Sillamäe, and between Aseri 
and Paldiski. Saaremaa, Hiiumaa, Haapsalu and some harbours 
on the southwest coast have earlier been subjected to landing 
operations. The northeast coast of the Gulf of Riga as well as the 
northwest and northern parts of Lake Peipus are also suitable for 
modern landing craft. An attack directed south of Lake Pskov 
towards the northwest or southwest most probably would involve 
the use of the Pskov-Riga highway. 
Arranging for the defence of northeastern Estonia requires 
attention to both the Tallinn-Narva highway and the roads 
running from the northern shores of Lake Peipus to Kohtla-
Järve. The Tallinn-Narva road and the area round about are 
particularly suitable for the massive use of tanks, and the terrain 
offers little natural defence. Even the Sinimäe hill area would be 
easily leapfrogged by helicopters. Defence possibilities are further 
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weakened by the ease of bypassing defence strongholds through 
resort to maritime operations across the Gulf of Finland. 
Still, the northeast is not impossible to defend; far from 
that. The swampy, wooded area north of Lake Peipus with its 
sparse road network provides ample opportunity for utilizing 
the terrain and guerilla-type operations. The terrain west of Tapa 
and Rakvere also provides considerable advantages to the 
defender. Nevertheless, to block movement in the direction of 
the Tallin-Narva highway and railroad would require large 
numbers of antitank and anti-aircraft missiles. 
The coastal defence of northeastern Estonia requires 
attention to two areas: the shores of the Gulf of Finland and those 
of Lake Peipus. That presupposes the establishing of permanent 
surveillance posts on both shores, and mobile formations ready 
to operate in both directions and equipped with coastal missiles. 
It is also easy to mine the north coast and block the passages to 
major harbours. 
The frontier areas of southeastern Estonia are wooded and 
the terrain is undulating. Farther to the northwest there are large 
fields suitable for extensive heliborne and airborne operations. 
Still further northwest and west, to the level of Räpina-Vöru-
Valga, the wooded and hilly terrain provides abundant 
opportunities to the defender. Using the terrain and guerilla-
type tactics the defender would easily be able at least to slow 
down an enemy advance towards Tartu. The defence of the 
Estonian-Latvian frontier presupposes cooperation between the 
two countries. 
Except for the extensive tracts of cultivated land about 
Valga, Estonia's frontier areas to the south are mainly wooded 
and swampy and the road network is not very dense. These 
frontier areas, too, favour the defender. The main problem is in 
the direction of the Riga-Pärnu highway, where two parallel 
roads run northwards along sandy and flat pine heath. Yet, even 
here a defence could be mounted from the woodlands stretching 
on the eastern side of the highway from the border up to Pärnu. 
The sandy beaches of the Gulf of Riga's northeastern coast 
lend themselves to landing operations. This, and the fact that the 
Riga-Pärnu highway runs close by the coast, underscores the 
need for defence cooperation between Estonia and Latvia and 
for effective arrangements to block the access to the Gulf of Riga 
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at the Straits of Irben. The coastal defence of Southwest Estonia 
has to cover not only Saaremaa and Hiiumaa but also the small 
harbours along the coast. Even in this direction the defence must 
be based on mines, permanent surveillance posts and mobile 
missile units. 
Although Estonia's northeastern border and her strategic 
objectives may not be easy to defend, the terrain and self-
sufficiency in food production give support to the defender. The 
defence may be begun from the sea and the frontiers and the 
resistance against occupation rely on a territorial defence covering 
the whole country. An effective defence nevertheless requires 
full-scale training of the whole male population, an ability to 
protect strategic objectives, local forces capable of guerilla-type 
operations, and modern mines and missile weaponry. 
Total Territorial Defence Concept 
The aim of Estonia's foreign policy is political, economic and 
military integration into Europe, even membership in Nato or 
the Western European Union [WEU]. Close ties with NATO are 
regarded as offering the best security guarantee of the Baltic 
republics (HS 26.3.1994, B17; HEISKARI 1992; SANTAVUORI 
1992; KNUUTI 1993a). In this respect, neutrality seems not to be 
an option at the moment (KNUUTI 1993a). Estonia is a member 
of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC] and has 
signed the Partnership for Peace agreement with NATO. 
National defence is provided for in paragraphs 1-2 and 
chapter X of the 1992 Constitution (VIRO 1993). A draft for the 
defence doctrine, "The Basic Principles of National Defence" 
[Riigikaitse Pöhialused] (VIRO 1993) was submitted to the 
Parliament [Riigikogu] on 11 March, 1993; on the basis of this the 
Parliament was to prepare a resolution commissioning the 
government to prepare legislation for the national defence. 
(HELME 1993) 
Note: By July 1994, the Parliament had not finished handling 
the draft and no final defence decision had been approved (VIRO 
1993). Thus, if not otherwise noted, the following synopsis is 
based on the draft and does not reflect a parliamentary decision. 
Geopolitically, Estonia lies between East and West, and 
stronger, imperialistic neighbours have previously exploited her 
frequently. For the moment, the prevailing thaw in East-West 
relations and increased international cooperation have diminished 
Estonia's military-political significance. However, the 
continuation of this state of affairs presupposes that reforms 
aiming at the establishment of democracy and a market economy 
continue in Russia. (VIRO 1993) 
Even after Russian forces have all withdrawn from Estonia, 
certain internal threats will still prevail. Large numbers of ex-
Soviet army officers and reserve officers live in the country and 
70 per cent of them possess automatic weapons. Some circles in 
northeastern Estonia have expressed a desire to transform that 
part of the country into an autonomous [Russian] district. If 
political forces become polarized in Russia the old leadership 
may try once again to seize power in Estonia. (VIRO 1993, 2-3) 
The greatest external threat is that Russia is restored as an 
imperialistic or communist state. The weakening of the Russian 
central government could mean loss of control of the Russian 
contingencies deployed near the Estonian border, and Russian 
armed paramilitary forces might initiate military action against 
Estonia. Conflicts, hunger and epidemics in the St. Petersburg 
area could encourage illegal immigration and bring a stream of 
refugees into Estonia. (VIRO 1993, 3) 
A major European war could also spill over into Estonia, 
and local skirmishes between other states might touch her soil in 
the form of international terrorism or counter-terrorism. A nuclear 
accident could take place in the Sosnovy Bor, Ignalina or Loviisa 
nuclear power plants located near by. Not even the possibility of 
local or world-wide nuclear war has been excluded in the draft. 
(VIRO 1993, 3) 
Estonian security policy [julgeolekupoliitika] calls for an 
active foreign policy [välispoliitika] and defence policy 
[kaitsepoliitika]. The national defence [riigikaitse] is based on a 
total national defence concept [totaalkaitse riigikaitselise 
printsiibi]. The overall security system thus comprises foreign 
policy and military policy with all its military, economic, civil 
defence and psychological dimensions. (VIRO 1993, 4) 
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Total natonal defence relies on the total infrastructure and 
defence forces of the country as well as on human and economic 
resources. The aim is to preserve peace and demonstrate such 
strength that the mere existence of the defence capability 
persuades the potential aggressor to reconsider (VIRO 1993, 4). 
The primary objective in establishing the defence forces was to 
create a situation such that Estonia could not simply be swept 
away without anybody noticing. That stage was achieved by late 
1993. (KNUUTI 1993a) 
The tasks of the national defence shall be: 1) to defend 
Estonian integrity and maintain the authority of the government 
appointed under the Constitution; 2) to control and defend the 
nation's land and sea territories and airspace; 3) to maintain law 
and order; 4) to provide education and training for those serving 
in the Defence Forces; 5) to guarantee the security and defence of 
citizens; 6) to prevent armed skirmishes and conflicts; and 7) to 
organize and undertake armed resistance in case of attack. (VIRO 
1993, 3-4) 
It is a constitutional requirement that all citizens take part 
in the national defence (VIRO 1993, 9). A law on universal 
conscription that concerns only males was passed by the 
Parliament in April 1994 (VAATTANEN 1994). Under the law, 
service in the defence forces is of 12 months duration 
(VAATTANEN 1994; RIUTTALA 1994, 46). The opportunity to 
undertake substitute service is available to those with alternative 
religious or moral convictions. (VIRO 1993, 9) 
The defence forces [kaitsejöud] would be composed of the 
Regular Army [kaitsevägi], Civil Guard [Kaitseliit], Frontier 
Guard [piirivalve], Military Formations for Internal Security 
[sojaväestadut sisekaitseuksuset], Coast Guard [rannavalve] and 
Rescue Formations [päästeteenistus]. (VIRO 1993, 5) 
Citizens' Army 
The Commander of the Defence Forces [kaitseväe juhatajal, who 
is in charge of the Regular Army and Civil Guard, is aided by 
General Headquarters [Kaitsejöudude Peastaap] and Civil Guard 
Headquarters [Kaitseliidu Staap]. A plan has been prepared to 
establish four Defence Areas [kaitseringkond]: Northern [Pöhja], 
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Southern [Löuna], Western [Lääne] and Maritime [Mere], with 
the respective headquarters located in Tallinn, Vöru/Tartu, 
Pärnu/Viljandi and Kuressaare in Saaremaa. In a more detailed 
plan the country would be further divided into 16 Defence 
Districts. (VIRO 1993, 6) 
Three services would be established: the Army [maavägi]; 
the Air Defence Forces, which would consist of radar units, anti-
aircraft artillery and air force; and the Navy [Merivägi], which 
would be composed of coastal defence units, marines and a 
Navy proper (VIRO 1993, 6). The Air Defence Forces and Navy 
have not thus far been established. (KNUUTI 1993b) 
Wartime defence forces would consist of general forces 
[iildrakendatavad väeosat] and local forces [territoriaalkaitse 
väeosad] (VIRO 1993, 6). The general forces, which would total 
some 15 brigades (KNUUTI 1993b), would engage the invader 
all over the country. Local forces would fight enemy air assault 
and landing troops and their special forces [spetsnaz] in their 
own district. Local defence would be organized by the Civil 
Guard Headquarters. (PEASTAAPI ULEM 1992, 5) 
The Civil Guard is a voluntary, non-political defence 
organization that operates according to a manual confirmed by 
the government. It is commanded by the Chief of Civil Guard 
[Kaitseliidu iilemaga] aided by his staff (VIRO 1993, 7). The 
guard is composed of 16 Civil Guards [malev = troop] divided 
further into 25 local sections [malevkond]. (KNUUTI 1993b) 
The Civil Guard has the right to issue its own manuals. It 
also has a youth organization [Nuoret Kotkat; Young Eagles] for 
7-14 year old boys (HELME 1993) and a women's organization 
(KUBU 1992b). The aim of the youth organization is to promote 
children's will to defend their country and enhance their physical 
condition. (HELME 1993) 
The Defence Forces' officer corps is educated at the War 
Academy [Söjakool] which until the end of 1993 was a faculty of 
the National Defence Academy. A graduate is expected to be 
able to command an infantry platoon and carry out the tasks of a 
company commander. To ease the acute shortage of officers, by 
the end of 1993 five officer courses lasting 2-6 months had been 
arranged (RIUTTALA 1994, 50-51). The non-commissioned 
officers are trained at Fighting School [Lahingukool] situated in 
Vöru. (MATTILA 1994) 
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To avoid a repeat of the tragic events of 1939 and 1940, the 
leadership of the Estonian defence is now committed to fight for 
the independence of the country, should it be threatened (HELME 
1993; LAANEOTS 1992). Fighting will begin from the coasts and 
frontiers in order to allow time for mobilization, and the campaign 
will be conducted within the framework of a territorial defence 
concept. (HELME 1993) 
However, when adapting the plans to the available limited 
resources, the conclusion has been that the war-fighting capability 
must first bring up to a level on which resistance is possible to 
conduct for some 3-4 weeks. (KNUUTI 1993b) 
Sentries of Security 
The Frontier Guard is an armed organization responsible for the 
inviolability of Estonian borders. In peacetime it is subordinated 
to the Ministry of the Interior and carries out its duties on the 
borders, airfields, harbours and sea frontier. In times of war and 
crisis it will be subordinated to the Supreme Commander of the 
Estonian armed forces. (VIRO 1993, 7) 
In peacetime, the Coast Guard is responsible to the Board 
of Navigation [Veeteede amet] but functions operationally under 
the General Headquarters. In times of war and crisis, it will be 
attached to the Navy. (VIRO 1993, 8) 
The Formations of Internal Security [sisekaitseuksused] 
are police and prison warder units (HELME 1993). These form 
the Operational Regiment of Internal Security [Sisekaitse 
Operatiivrugementi], which in peacetime is subordinated to the 
police. In times of war and crisis the regiment will be attached to 
the Defence Forces and subordinated to the Supreme Commander 
of the armed forces. (VIRO 1993, 8) 
Rescue units are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Defence 
[kodanikukaitseseaduset] and comply with the four Geneva 
Conventions from the year 1949 and their two amendments of 
1977. In wartime they will not take part in armed action but will 
contribute to the total defence by carrying out their own 
responsibilities related to Civil Defence and rescue operations. 
(VIRO 1993, 8) 
Whose armed Forces ? 
The Estonian constitution vests the President of the Republic 
with almost no power in foreign policy issues in peacetime 
(NIIRANEN 1992), but his supreme leadership of the armed 
forces gives him a special role in times of peace and especially 
crisis. The President appoints officers and presents to the 
Parliament his choice as candidate for the Commander of the 
Defence Forces (SARASMO 1992b). In defence issues the President 
is aided by the Defence Council [Kaitsenöukogu]. (VIRO 1993, 
Appendix 5 and 6) 
In times of crisis the President has the power to declare a 
state of war and to mobilize the armed forces if the country is 
invaded. Should some external circumstances prevent the 
assembling of Parliament he can make decisions in the name of 
Parliament, supported by the Prime Minister and the Speaker of 
the Parliament. If the country is in a state of emergency the 
Constitution concentrates even more decision-making power in 
the hands of the President, who stays outside day-to-day-politics. 
(SARASMO 1992b) 
The relationships between the highest leaders of the armed 
forces will be regulated in laws yet to be enacted. In the draft of 
the defence doctrine it is stated that in peacetime the Commander 
of the Defence Forces, and in wartime the Supreme Commander 
[Kaitseväe ulemjuhataja] under whom the Defence Forces are to 
operate, should be directly responsible to the President. (VIRO 
1993, Appendix 5 and 6) 
At the government level, defence issues are the 
responsibility of the Minister of Defence aided by the Ministry of 
Defence [kaitseministeerium]. Together they formulate defence 
and military doctrines and look after legislation, organization, 
training and equipping of troops (REBAS 1993). They also direct 
defence policy, take charge of economic matters and look after 
issues related to the administration, infrastructure and health 
care of the Defence Forces. In the Parliament defence issues are 
handled by a permanent Defence Commission 
[riigikaitsekomisjon] (HELME 1993). Some initiatives have been 
taken in government circles to attach the General Headquarters 
more closely to the Ministry of Defence (LOUENIVA 1992). If 
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this happens, the influence of the government in defence issues 
would increase. Plans have also been presented to the effect that 
all the armed forces' units in which conscripts are serving should 
be responsible in peacetime to the Ministry of Defence (WALTER 
1992). That would transfer the supervision of the Frontier Guard 
from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defence. It 
would also increase the power of President in security issues. 
Self Defence Capability 
Certain ideological and psychological problems have existed in 
the will of citizens to defend their country. Some have a lingering 
opposition to service dating back to Soviet times (LAANEOTS 
1992). Moreover, Estonian ex-Soviet officers are not regarded as 
fully apropriate or competent for the new tasks (LAANEOTS 
1992, JARVE 1992). Conditions in garrisons have been spartan. 
Finally, not even legal sanctions exist against those who simply 
refuse to enter military service (SARASMO 1992a; KUBU 1992b; 
HS 19.3.1993, A14). Despite all this, some 70 per cent of males in 
the age cohort liable for service joined the ranks in 1993. 
(RIUTTALA 1994, 46) 
The annual budget of the Defence Forces in 1993 totalled 
just over USD 20 million and comprised some 3-4 per cent of the 
national budget. Much of the funds had to be applied to rebuilding 
garrisons destroyed by departing Russian troops 
(HAAPAVAARA 1992, A18; LOUENIVA 1994a). By early 1994, 
the living conditions of garrisons had been brought up to a 
satisfactory level, as had the equipment necessary for training; 
and there was also more money available for other training 
purposes. (LOUENIVA 1994a) 
In 1993, the Estonian Defence Forces were composed of 
three small infantry battalions ['Kalev' in Jägala, 'Viru' in Jöhvi 
and 'Kuperjanov' in Vöru], a Signal Company in fägala, a Guards 
Battalion, Transportation Battalion and Radar Battalion in Tallinn 
(HELME 1993, KNUUTI 1993b; KUBU 1992a; HAAPAVAARA 
1992; WIKSTRÖM 1992). In 1992, small rescue/civil defence units 
were deployed at Jöhvi, Tartu, Tallinn and Pärnu, and in 1994 
independent infantry companies were stationed at Pärnu, Tartu, 
Paldiski and Tapa. 
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In early 1994, the peacetime Army of some 5000 men 
consisted of motorized infantry equipped with small arms, some 
mortars, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The aim is to 
increase the strength up to 10 000 men, of which one third would 
be professionals (LOUENIVA 1994a). Most of the four hundred 
officers in active service were Estonian ex-Soviet professional or 
reserve officers. The first ten officers graduated from the Finnish 
Military Academy in 1994 and another ten will graduate in 1995. 
(RIUTTALA 1994, 46; LOUENIVA 1994a) 
Until such time as the Defence Forces have produced 
enough reserves to establish wartime brigades, it would of course 
be possible to use reservists that were trained in the Soviet Army. 
In spring 1993, each city still had an operating National Defence 
Section, charged with the task of carrying out mobilization and 
maintaining a list of those who had served in the Soviet forces. 
Available weapons were few. Moreover, a loophole in the 
covering legislation meant that the reservists could not be called 
into refresher training exercises. 
In 1994, the Frontier Guard comprised 2400 men - 1400 
professionals, 1000 conscripts and 100 Coast Guard men (KOUTS 
1994, 30). Equipment consisted of ex-Soviet light arms, and some 
lorries and technical equipment donated by Germany (TS 
25.2.1993,16; HELME 1993). The Coast Guard had one unarmed 
ex-Swedish and three lightly armed ex-Finnish patrol boats. 
(KNUUTI 1993b; AL 21.8.1992, 11) 
Russia handed over to Estonia her former sea surveillance 
radar installations in Tahkuna, Kopu and Saaremaa in February 
1993 (HS 17.2. 1993 Cl). Two old L-140 aeroplanes of 
Czechoslovakian origin were additionally available for sea-
patrolling. (HELME 1993) 
Border guarding operations in early 1993 were still 
concentrated only around border crossing posts, and coast guard 
activities around Narvajoesuu and on the Narva. Because of the 
lack of personnel, Frontier Guard conscripts received only two 
months basic training before beingsent to border posts. Their 
military skills and usefulness in wartime duties represent a rather 
modest level therefore. 
In late 1993, the Civil Guard was about 6500 strong, 
including some 100 paid personnel (KNUUTI 1993b). Its 
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weaponry was motley and mostly acquired from various sources 
by the volunteers themselves (SARASMO 1992a). In Haapsalu 
and Pärnu there were also two old ex-Soviet patrol boats 
possessed by local civil guards. (JARVE 1992) 
The efficiency and political reliability of the Civil Guard 
were at one point undermined by the rivalry between different 
political factions over the key issue of the attitude towards ex-
Soviet Estonian Army officers (JARVE 1992; KUBU 1992b). The 
radical wing had been established in the late 1980's by citizens 
close to the Estonian government in exile (JARVE 1992). After 
some rebellious actions by the radicals, which even led to the 
retirement of the Minister of Defence in 1993 (KNUUTI 1993a), 
the situation now seems to be under control. 
Western and Nordic countries have on many occasions 
refused to sell weaponry to Estonia (UMMELAS 1994). Thus, 
defence material is mainly of Soviet origin acquired from Russian 
sources and bought from countries such as Romania (IS 
15.12.1992). Lately, some weapons have also been bought from 
Israel. The current hope is to purchase weaponry of NATO 
standards from Israel, China, South Africa and international 
markets. (UMMELAS 1994) 
In March 1994, moreover, the United States lifted her arms 
sales embargo to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (TS 24.3.1994). 
Some efforts have also been made toward establishing a small-
scale domestic defence industry. (KUBU 1992a, LINSIO 1992) 
Long March 
The building of Estonian armed forces and a viable defence 
capability is a project that will last decades. Small age cohorts, 
which cannot be trained either completely or properly, produce 
reserves very slowly. The quality of military training is suffering 
not only from the deficiency of material but from the lack of field 
manuals and instructors. Moreover, Russian military thinking, 
tactics and way of soldiering are not suitable for a small 
democratic country, and it will take decades before Estonia's 
own Military Academy provides enough adequately trained 
officers. 
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The lack of instructors and defence material will also make 
the use of reserves in local defence relatively difficult for a long 
time. The Civil Guard may provide some relief in this respect, 
but the number of its members should be drastically increased 
and cooperation between individual guards and the General 
Headquarters needs to be smoother. 
Although the Estonian economy seems to be recovering 
quite well (HANTTU-KISKONEN 1992), the national product 
will remain small for years and there will be little in the way of 
funds to be spent on defence. According to one estimate, the 
minimum material level of the Estonian Defence Forces, 
proportioned to that of Finland, would be some 60 tanks, 20 
interceptors, 6 missile boats and 100 armoured personnel carriers. 
The price of that amount of defence equipment would be about 
USD 400 million. (SANTAVUORI 1992) 
There are plenty of weapons available on U.S. and world 
markets but only in exchange for hard currencies. Massive western 
aid or a miracle in the Estonian economy is therefore a prerequisite 
for solving the worst material problems quickly. If Estonia is left 
to equip her armed forces herself, it will be years before even the 
controlling of territory and airspace and the guarding of borders 
are on a satisfactory level. In realistic terms, the defence 
capabilities of Estonia will remain modest for some two decades. 
However, as long as no crises arise in the Baltic Basin the 
matter is not serious. From the viewpoint of Finnish and Swedish 
security, the proximity of the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, 
Paldiski and the larger Estonian islands are a real strategic issue. 
The ability of Estonia to control her own territory and defend it is 
important to both countries. In the end, the steady development 
of Estonia's control and defence capabilities is in the interest of 
all countries in the Baltic Basin, and ultimately in the interest of 
Russia as well. 
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5 LATVIA: LAND OF AMBER 
With an area of 64 600 square kilometres, Latvia is a little smaller 
than Ireland and one third bigger than Denmark and Estonia. 
The Republic of Latvia borders on Estonia in the north, Russia 
and Belarus in the east, Lithuania in the south and the Baltic Sea 
in the west. The maximum length of the country is 210 kilometres 
measured from south to north and 410 kilometres measured 
from west to east. (TBS 1991, 89) 
Baltic sources commonly give the overall length of Latvian 
borders as 1800 kilometres, 339 kilometres of which are common 
with Estonia and 610 with Lithuania (TBS 1991, 13, 89, 175). 
Measured on the map, however, land borders are only 1100 
kilometres long, 275 kilometres of which are common with 
Estonia, 220 with Russia, 136 with Belarus and 455 with Lithuania. 
(GROSSE REISEKARTE 1992) 
MAP 7: Latvia. 
The northeasternmost corner of Latvia, the Abrene area which 
was joined to her in 1920, was annexed in 1945 to the Russian 
Republic (MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA 1983, 71). Since then, the 
population of this 2000 square kilometre area has been Russified 
and in 1991 only some 300 of its inhabitants were Latvians 
(RISLAKKI 1991a). The Abrene area is not vital to the defence of 
Latvia, but Abrene itself, nowadays located on Russian soil, is a 
railway junction through which runs the shortest railway 
connexion between the Latvian cities Vecum and Karsava. 
(STIPRAIS 1991) 
Latvia consists of four historical counties: Kurzeme in the 
west, Vidzeme [Livonia] in the north, Latgale in the east and 
Zemgale south of the Daugava River. Bedrock is limestone in the 
southwest and dolomite in the middle and the east. Most of the 
country is covered by glacial deposits, but also clay is found in 
several parts and sand near the coast. (TBS 1991, 90) 
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The coastal lowland is some 2 to 50 kilometres wide and 
varies in height from 5 to 60 metres (TBS 1991, 90). The highest 
point of the Kursa elevation in Kurzeme [Courland Peninsula] is 
Krievukalns, 184 metres above sea level. The central Zemgale 
plain is dominated by the Riga-Jelgava lowland, which in the 
north lies below sea-level and in the south does not rise more 
than 25 metres above it. (TBS 1991, 90; SILVANTO 1927, 12-13) 
The Vidzeme elevation in the north rises to an average 180 
metres above sea-level, the highest point, at 312 metres, being 
Gaizinkalns in the southeastern corner. The Vidzeme elevation 
also includes some parts of the Gauja River valley and stretches 
north of the Riga-Pskov highway A 212. The Latgale upland lies 
in the eastern part of the country where the land rises 170-180 
metres above sea-level. (TBS 1991, 90; SILVANTO 1927,12-13) 
Some 41 per cent of Latvia is covered by forests. Richly 
wooded areas are found in the northern parts of Kurzeme and 
Vidzeme and along the lower courses of the rivers Daugava and 
Gauja. About 10 per cent of the country is swampland. The most 
extensive swamps lie in the coastal and East-Latvian lowlands, 
while the richest farmland is around Dobele, Jelgava and Bauska. 
(TBS 1991, 89-90) 
More than 3000 lakes larger than one hectare cover about 
1.7 per cent of Latvian territory. Lakes are generally very shallow 
with an average depth of only 1-5 metres. Some 40 per cent of the 
lakes are in the Latgale elevation in the east, but there are many 
in the coastal lowland as well. The largest rivers are the Daugava 
and Gauja. Of the other more than 12 000 rivers, only 17 are 
longer than 100 kilometres (TBS 1991, 90). From the military 
point of view, the Venta River [Windau] which crosses the 
Kurzeme plateau, and all the rivers of the Riga-Jelgava lowland, 
are also significant. 
Latvia's climate is variable. For instance, some 120-140 
lows and gales are counted each year. The average temperatures 
in January vary from -2.6 C in the west to -6.6 C in the east, those 
in July from +16.8 C to + 17.6 C. Annual precipitation is a 
moderate 600-650 millimetres. Because of numerous thaws, the 
snow cover seldom exceeds 15-20 millimetres. Exceptionally, in 
the Vidzeme elevation in the north about 50 centimetres snow 
may accumulate in ordinary winters. (TBS 1991, 90) 
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In 1990, some 916 500 people, and about 34 per cent of the 
total population, lived in Riga. Other large cities were Daugavpils 
[128 200], Liepaja [114 900], Jelgava [75 100], Jurmala [66 400], 
Ventspils [50 400] and Rezekne [42 9001. (TBS 1991, 89) 
Thoroughfares 
The total length of the Latvian road network is 20 600 kilometres 
(TBS 1991, 99). Main roads generally run from south to north and 
southwest to northeast, reflecting Latvia's significance as a transit 
area. From the military point of view, the Riga-Pskov highway 
and the section of the Via Baltica that runs across Latvia are of 
special importance. 
The Ostrov-Rezekne Daugavpils-Kaunas/Vilnius highway 
is another major transit route. The Riga-Daugavpils highway 
running on the northern side of the Daugava is an important 
interstate road. Main roads are generally surfaced and broad, 
but the condition of the road network is not very good with the 
exception of the area around Riga. 
MAP 7: Latvia. 
Latvia's road network is connected with that of Estonia in more 
than 20 places, and with that of Russia by four highways and 
fewer than 20 smaller roads. Three main roads and about 15 
smaller ones lead from Latvia to Belarus, and seven main roads 
and tens of smaller ones to Lithuania. 
Some 271 kilometres of Latvia's 2397-kilometre-long railway 
network has been electrified (TBS 1991, 99). The guage is 1524 
millimetres, as in Russia. The railway between Riga and 
Daugavpils and the Karsava-Daugavpils section of the St. 
Petersburg-Warsaw railway are double tracked. Two railway 
connections run to Estonia, three to St. Petersburg, one to Moscow, 
one to Minsk and five to Lithuania. When the Soviet Union 
collapsed, Latvia got possession of numerous railway depots 
and engineering workshops located on her soil. (NURMI 1993) 
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The Daugavpils District in the southeastern part of Latvia 
holds special strategic value as a transit area because of its many 
crossroads and railway junctions. In 1991, the daily frequency of 
road traffic in that area was 2600 vehicles between Daugavpils 
and Vilnius and 400-900 between Warsaw and St. Petersburg. 
(GEIBA 1991) 
All Latvia's seaports - Riga, Ventspils and Liepaja - are of 
strategic importance. The Bolderaja naval base near Riga was 
once a major Soviet naval shipyard (AL 28.6.1992, 27). Ventspils 
is Latvia's busiest export port and it was also the Soviet Union's 
only oil and gas export terminal on the Baltic Sea, the end point 
of the 1121-kilometre-long Polotsk-Ventspils oil and gas pipeline 
(TBS 1991, 99; HS 11.9.1991, C2). In 1989, about 38 million tonnes 
of freight including 32 million tonnes of oil products were handled 
in Latvian ports. (TBS 1991, 99) 
Latvia's ordinary airports at Riga, Daugavpils and Ventspils 
were used by both civilian and military aeroplanes during the 
Soviet era. Soviet military air bases were located at Vainode, 
Tukums, Lielvarde, Jekabpils, Paplaka, Jelgava and Krutspils. 
(OB 1992, 7-8) 
In 1992, calls to Finland could be made through Riga's 
NMT-450 mobile phone network (TKL 1991, 8; HS 9.10.1992, 
B13), and other international calls through satellite (PESONEN 
1992, 19). In October 1992, a wider NMT-450 network became 
operational covering first the larger towns (HS 9.10.1992, B13). 
Telecommunications to Russia and other CIS countries still go 
via Moscow. International telecommunications will improve only 
after Latvia is connected with the fibreoptic cable coming from 
Helsinki via Tallinn. 
Gulf of Riga and Baltic Sea 
Relatively deep (POHJOIS-ITAMERI 1982) and badly polluted 
(TIMONEN 1993), the Gulf of Riga is Latvia's and Estonia's 
mutual 'inner sea' which freezes only in the severest winters. It is 
reached in the north through the Strait of Suur Väin and in the 
southwest through the Strait of Irben, which separates Saaremaa 
from the northwest coast of Kurzeme. In the northeast, waters 
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become deep a few kilometres from the coast, but south of 
Salgagriva very close to the shore. 
Off Latvia's west coast, the sea remains unfrozen even in 
the coldest winters. Coastal waters are shallow, less than 10 
metres deep, up to 1-3 kilometres from the shore. At Ventspils, 
which lies at the mouth of the Venta, the sea-bed drops down to 
40-50 metres about 15 kilometres from the coast. Near Liepaja, 
the water becomes 40 metres deep about 25 kilometres from the 
shore and the Gotland Deep is less than 50 kilometres from the 
city. (ETELÄ-ITÄMERI 1981) 
The deep water nearby and the central location of Liepaja 
probably were the key factors behind the establishing of the 
main base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet there. 
Latvia's coast is 500 kilometres long, straight, with no 
islands and very few capes (TBS 1991, 81). Its single prominent 
point protruding to the sea is Kolka Horn [Kolkasrags]. 
Underwater sand bars make the coastal waters unsuitable for 
seafaring or anchorages (SILVANTO 1927, 8), though they are 
easily navigated by amphibious vessels and hovercraft. 
A long sand embankment runs parallel to the west coast 
some 30-60 metres from the shoreline. It is 10 metres high at 
maximum, broad, grass-covered, and with occasional tall trees. 
Here and there it disappears into the sandy shore. Sometimes yet 
another ridge runs parallel to the first, but this is either fully 
wooded or has become indistinguishable from the terrain of the 
coastal lowland. The eastern coast of the Gulf of Riga is in places 
bordered with bluffs but there is no regular embankment. 
(SILVANTO 1927, 9) 
A highway runs along the coast, and between Riga and 
Saulkraist the Riga-Tartu railway. From the Gulf of Riga, four 
main roads run inland. Main roads also connect the larger coastal 
towns of Kurzeme to the cities of Tukums, Talsi, Kuldiga and 
Saldus. 
Latvia set her territorial waters in 1990 at 12 nautical miles. 
The only places where problems of interpretation might occur 
are the waters between Roja and the island of Ruhnu and in the 
Strait of Irben. A question of some interest is whether Latvia is 
able to arrange adequate surveillance and control and sea-rescue 
activities in her wide territorial waters. 
A Bare Majority 
According to the 1989 census, Latvia had a population of 2 680 
000, of which some 71 per cent lived in urban centres. The average 
density of population was 41 persons per square kilometre, but 
most of the population lived in an area covering only six per cent 
of the total territory, and especially in and around Riga. The 
density was lowest near Ventspils where it was only some six 
persons per square kilometre. (TBS 1991, 91-92) 
Births in 1987 numbered 42 135 but in 1990 had declined to 
37 918. Even mortality, which bottomed in 1988, began to increase 
again in 1990 (BARANOVSKI 1991). On the grounds of these 
statistics it is quite impossible to predict demographic 
development in Latvia, or the strength of the cohorts of able-
bodied males that can be produced for the needs of the armed 
forces. 
At 52 per cent [1 388 000] ethnic Latvians only just form a 
majority of the population. The largest minorities are Russians 
[906 000; 34%], Belarussians [120 000; 4.5%], Ukranians [92 000; 
3.5%], Poles [60 000; 2.3%] and Lithuanians [35 000; 1.3%] (TBS 
1991, 93). In regard to language, it is notable that 48 per cent of 
the population uses Russian and not Latvian in daily 
communication. (VANHALAKKA 1992) 
Latvians are clearly in the minority in Riga, comprising 
only one third of the capital's 916 000 inhabitants. Russians also 
form a vast majority in the strategically important city and district 
of Daugavpils. Some 84 per cent of Daugavpils' 128 000 
inhabitants in 1992 were of other ethnic origin than Latvian 
(ANDREJEVS 1992). The population of the Daugavpils District 
in 1991 was 47 000, of which, by birth, 35 per cent were Latvians, 
12 per cent Poles and 53 per cent Russians. (GEIBA 1992) 
The large Russian population dates back to the time of the 
Czars when Latvia became a popular place for retired army 
officers; the trend continued after 1945. In 1991 some 60 000 ex-
Soviet officers lived in Latvia (KARVONEN 1991). An influx of 
Russian workers occurred in the early 1960's when the country 
became heavily industrialized. The underlying purpose of this 
may have been Russification since Latvia had neither raw 
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materials nor a labour force of its own, essential for the production. 
(ANDREJEVS 1992) 
Latvia's Inter-Movement, supported by about 300 000 
Russians, was banned in August 1991 (HOLOPAINEN 1991) but 
some undercover activities may still be going on. In autumn 1991 
the violent special troops, OMONs, responsible to the Soviet 
Ministry of the Interior, were expelled from the country. Some 50 
of them never did leave, however, and evidently went 
underground, many of them with their firearms. (ANDREJEVS 
1992) 
The Parliament passed the very strict Bill of Citizenship in 
June 1994 (HS 22.6.1994, Cl). Citizenship is granted to all those 
who lived in Latvia in 1940, and to their descendants. This group 
includes some 400 000 people who are not ethnic Latvians. 
(ANDREJEVS 1992) 
Approximately one third of the 800 000 people, who do not 
meet the basic criterium, but are older than 16 and born in Latvia 
after 1940, can apply citizenship in 1996-2000. The remaining 500 
000 can apply citizenship after the year 2000, but the quota will 
be no more than some thousand new citizens annually. (HS 
23.6.1994, C2) 
The Government has since the end of June 1994 tried to get 
the Bill being changed because the strict formulation is likely to 
harm Latvia's relations with the European Union and the 
European Council (HS 23.6.1994, C2). It is thus possible that the 
Bill may be later reformulated. 
In poor economic and socially unstable times, the large 
Russian minority residing in strategic areas of the country could 
pose a security risk. In considering the question of citizenship it 
needs to be remembered that too liberal regulations in this respect 
may in time threaten the status of ethnic, Latvian-speaking 
Latvians in their own country. 
There are some 7000 to 8000 etnic Latvian males in each 
age cohort and, if 80-90 per cent of them could be trained in 
national service, reserves would increase by 6000 to 7000 men 
annually. After 20 years, Latvia's wartime armed forces would 
then consist of some 140 000 men. A wartime army of that size 
could easily sustain an effective territorial defence throughout 
the country. 
Paved Road from Pskov 
From Latvia's perspective, the major strategic object is Riga with 
its harbours and airports. However, the capital is not easily 
conquered by raid owing to its geographical location; a successful 
operation would almost certainly presuppose the use of 
substantial ground forces or a strong 'fifth column'. Another 
strategically valuable area is the southeastern corner of the 
country, which Russia, Belarus and Lithuania also find of interest. 
In the north, between Ainazi and Valga, swampy and in 
places also wooded border areas could easily be defended by 
fighters able to exploit the terrain. Coastal defence lines could of 
course be penetrated by a flanking operation from the sea. In this 
direction, Limbazi-Valmiera-Smiltene, and Valmiera itself, possess 
definite strategic value since the road network towards Riga 
becomes significantly denser to the south and southwest. 
The paved road running from Pskov in Russia via Estonia 
to Riga is the most important strategic direction in the northeast. 
Aluksene and Gulbene are also of some significance from the 
operational viewpoint, since numerous smaller roads run towards 
them from the east. From Gulbene there is a road connexion to 
the Daugava River, which passes by the Vidzeme Uplands. 
In the northeast, swampy, wooded and hilly terrain is 
favourable to the defender, although certain roads there are 
accessible to the invader. In the east-southeast the defence can be 
based on the Vidzeme Uplands, which channels movement into 
a few passages. 
With its density of road and rail connections the Ludza-
Rezekne-Kraslava-Daugavpils area in the southeast is suitable 
for strategic troop concentrations. The area is part of the Latgale 
elevation, whose wooded and hilly terrain with abundant lakes 
favours the defender. In the defence of Rezekne and Daugavpils, 
the Krsava-Ludza-Kraslava level is of great importance because 
the road network west of there allows the attacker wide freedom 
of operation. 
Northwest of Daugavpils there opens an access to Riga by 
the road and railway running on the north bank of the Daugava. 
These traffic routes can also be accessed directly from Rezekne at 
Jekabpils and Plavinas. On the south bank of the Daugava there 
is another road, whose condition significantly improves in 
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Jekabpils. The river itself is not an unsurmountable obstacle with 
modern military equipment. 
The road network of the plain south of the Daugava River 
is sparse in the east, and south of Jekabpils roads run mainly 
from north to south or northeast to southwest. The Plain is 
favourable for attack and it was used for offensive purposes in 
both world wars. Despite its numerous rivers, the Jelgava-Bauska 
region in the western part of the Plain is a natural invasion route 
toward Riga because of the dense road network. The Zemgale 
plain is difficult to defend but with guerilla operations may offer 
some means to slow down enemy movement. 
The Kursa elevation in Kurzeme [Courland Peninsula], 
and the Venta River flowing across it, are natural hindrances to 
invasion from the west. Kursa channels movement in two 
directions: to the coastal plain and the Jelgava-Bauska lowland. 
In the direction of the Jelgava-Bauska lowland, the Kursa elevation 
may only provide a sheltered assembly area for counterattacks. 
But against an attack directed towards Riga from the coast of the 
Baltic Sea, it offers good opportunities for defence. 
Latvia's seacoast is easily penetrated by landing craft and 
especially hovercraft. Coastal sand dunes covered with trees 
may favour the defender in places, but they can also be controlled 
by fire from sea and air. The Coastal plain and Kursa elevation 
allow easy surveillance and control of the territorial waters, coast 
and air space. The Strait of Irben can be blocked by mines, 
artillery and coastal missiles from both sides. 
Topographical features favour a defence begun from the 
borders and coasts. Latvia, it would seem, should put her 
emphasis on vast reserves, a territorial defence concept based on 
guerilla tactics, and the use of surface-to-air, anti-tank and coastal 
missiles. 
Squeezed as she is between Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia 
has a critical need to cooperate with her neighbours and adjust 
her defence plans with theirs. Cooperation is particularly 
important in the northeastern, eastern and southeastern parts of 
the country. In the light of history it would also seem wise to 
arrange the defence of the Bauska-Jelgava area in cooperation 
with Lithuania. 
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In Case of Fifth Columns 
A Draft for a Defence Concept was prepared in Latvia's Ministry 
of Defence in 1991-1992 and is due to be passed by the Parliament 
elected in 1993. 
Note: By July 1994 discussion of the draft (LATVIA 1992) 
in Parliament was still going on. If not otherwise noted, therefore, 
the synopsis that follows is based on the draft and does not 
necessarily reflect parliamentary decision. 
According to the Minister of Defence, Mr. Valdis 
PAVLOVSKIS, the only way to ensure Latvia's security is to 
participate in European security systems such as WEU or NATO. 
It is Latvia's long-range goal, therefore, to join these organizations. 
(TS 1.3.1994, 12) 
Latvia will also cooperate with other European countries 
and develop a defence system with her neighbours (LATVIA 
1992, 1). Latvia is a member of NACC, has signed the Partnership 
for Peace agreement and regards close ties with NATO as the 
main security guarantee for the Baltic republics. (I-IS 26.3.1994, 
B17) 
The road to defence cooperation among the Baltic republics 
may be rocky because of the lack of historical precedent, economic 
means and ciphered telecommunications (STIPRAIS 1992). The 
first joint battalion size manoeuvre was nevertheless held in 
southern Estonia in February 1.994. (TS 23.2.1994, 12) 
Other joint projects will be the surveillance of borders, air 
space (TS 1.3.1994, 12) and territorial waters, organizing a joint 
peace-keeping unit by November 1995 (ETA 1994), regular 
meetings of defence ministers and chiefs of the general 
headquarters, and further joint field manoeuvres. (KNUUTI 
1993b) 
Latvia does not regard a democratic Russian government 
as an external threat. But a threat might emerge if imperialistic, 
nationalistic forces were to gain power in Moscow (KNUUTI 
1993a). It cannot be excluded that an external attack against the 
Baltic republics could materialize even in post-Cold War Europe. 
(PAVLOVSKIS 1992, 1, 3) 
Armed units within the country that might be moved to re-
establish a Communist or other form of totalitarian government 
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pose a certain threat (LATVIA 1992). Some groups may even 
possess heavy weaponry (STIPRAIS 1992) received from Russia's 
armed forces (PAVLOVSKIS 1992, 2). These armed groups consist 
of Communists and Russian activists but also Latvian extreme 
nationalists. (TS 25.11.1992, 11) 
The Home Guard of the Latvian Popular Front [Aizsargis] 
was established at the outset of the campaign for re-independence 
(THE GUARDIAN 23.3.1990, 10; THE TIMES 5.5.1990,18). Some 
hundreds of members of this former nationalistic security 
organization allegedly began underground activities as early as 
August 1991 (ZVAIGZNE 1991). Even the legal Latvian Civil 
Guard [Semzsargis] was responsible in 1992 for 54 armed 
incidents in which 7 persons were killed and 31 wounded. 
(KNUUTI 1993b) 
The strategic objectives of the defence system are to 
safeguard Latvian territory and air space, and to defend the 
country by military and other means until aid can be acquired 
from the international community. The defence system must 
also be capable of guaranteeing governmental functions in times 
of invasion and terrorist activities. The defence forces must be 
able to implement mobilization and fulfil their responsibilities 
under centralized and decentralized leadership, and be prepared 
to use guerilla tactics if need be. (LATVIA 1992, 1-2) 
Parliament's Defence Forces 
Latvia's national defence is supervised by the State Defence 
Council functioning under the Parliament [Saeima] and headed 
by the President who is also the Speaker of the Parliament. The 
Defence Council has the power to order mobilization and to 
declare a state of war, the latter only with parliamentary consent, 
however. (LATVIA 1992) 
In peacetime the Defence Forces are headed by the 
Commander of Defence Forces who also coordinates the activities 
of the Frontier Guard and Civil Guard in border areas. During a 
state of war the President is the Supreme Commander of the 
national Defence Forces, under whom the Commander of Defence 
Forces conducts all military action. The Ministry of Defence 
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[Aizsardzibas ministrijal prepares a national defence plan to be 
approved by the Defence Council. (LATVIA 1992) 
The Defence Forces consist of the Frontier Guard, Mobile 
Riflemen Forces [light infantry], Air Forces, Air Defence Forces 
and Navy. In the event of an invasion the Mobile Riflemen 
Forces will be supplemented by reservists and, together with the 
Civil Guard, form the Riflemen Forces. (LATVIA 1992, 4) 
The Frontier Guard is responsible for guarding the borders 
and preventing illegal border crossings. Mobile Riflemen Forces 
take care of defence operations throughout the country, function 
as a Rapid Reaction Force, assist the Frontier Guard in protecting 
the borders and take care of mobilization preparations. (LATVIA 
1992, 4) 
The Civil Guard [Semzsargis] is a public, volunteer military 
organization (LATVIA 1992, 5) supervised by the Parliament in 
peacetime and the Ministry of Defence in wartime (KNUUTI 
1993b). It participates in Latvia's national defence and civil 
defence, protects important objectives, and gives aid to the 
Frontier Guard. The Civil Guard Headquarters supervises 
individual civil guards, and sees to their mobilization and combat 
readiness. (LATVIA 1992, 5-6) 
Other security assets are the special units of the Ministry of 
the Interior, the Unit for Protection of the Constitution [an 
intelligence organization], civil defence units and the units of 
non-violent resistance. Non-violent resistance would rely on mass 
disobedience, sabotage and other such activities, targetting these 
against a puppet government set up by an occupier or against 
those who seize power in a coup. (LATVIA 1992, 7) 
Difficult Beginning 
Conscription is universal but conscripts may serve either in the 
armed forces where the tour of service is 18 months or in substitute 
service. Reserves are composed of men trained in the ranks of 
the Defence Forces or Civil Guard. Young men of Russian origin 
who can be expected to take out Latvian citizenship have, in 
practice, also been accepted as conscripts (STIPRAIS 1992). 
Latvia's defence expenditures totalled 3.6 per cent of the 
government budget in 1993. (KNUUTI 1993b) 
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The Defence Forces were not established until February 
1992 (STIPRAIS 1992) because the Frontier Guard had been placed 
in top priority. In autumn 1993 the strength of the Army was 
some 800 men in two mechanized battalions. The Navy had 
three vessels, in addition to which Germany had donated two 
unarmed mine sweepers and three missile boats. Air Forces had 
eight Mi-8 helicopters, twelve An-2 transporters and two L-410 
liaison aircraft. Frontier Guard was composed of about 2500 men 
and Civil Guard of 10 000 persons including some females. 
(KNUUTI 1993b) 
Plans call for an increase in the number of conscripts to 75-
80 per cent of males in the age cohort, which would provide the 
Army with some 2000 and the Frontier Guard with about 5000 
men each year (STIPRAIS 1992). The army would consist of four 
mechanized infantry battalions, one reconnaissance battalion and 
a signal and an engineer unit. The army would be equipped only 
with light infantry weapons and have neither field artillery nor 
tanks. The Frontier Guard is to be 5500 men strong and be 
composed of one brigade with nine battalions. (KNUUTI 1993b) 
Already in autumn 1992 the number of Civil Guard 
members was 15 000, of which some 800 commanding officers 
and sergeant majors of companies were paid by the government 
(STIPRAIS 1992). A preliminary plan called for the establishment 
of one civil guard battalion in each of Latvia's eight provinces 
(ZVAIGZNE 1991). The overall number of reserves has been 
targeted at about 100 000 men. (KNUUTI 1993b) 
The training programme for officers in the Frontier Guard 
commenced in October 1991 (STIPRAIS 1991), and the Military 
Academy, which is subordinated to the Minister of Defence, was 
established in autumn 1992. Latvia has also signed a protocol on 
officer training with Poland and is ready to accept western 
educational aid (STIPRAIS 1992). Although help has been 
obtained from some western military advisers of Latvian origin, 
the officer corps for a long time will consist predominantly of ex-
Soviet officers. 
Unique Defence Problems 
Estonia's and Latvia's threat scenarios are alike, and both 
countries are preparing to face internal as well as external threats. 
However, Latvia's internal threats have their origins in the history 
and in the strong ethnic minorities. One can predict that the 
actual capability of both countries to defend their territories will 
remain on a low level for decades. 
The drafts of Estonia's and Latvia's defence concepts differ 
in one essential point. In building her peacetime armed forces, 
Latvia is planning to put much greater emphasis than Estonia on 
the Frontier Guard because of her considerably longer land 
borders. Surveillance and control of these borders with normal 
equipment is also more difficult. Another relevant factor may be 
that ethnic Latvians are a minority in the strategic eastern parts 
of the country and in the capital. 
A further difference between Latvia and Estonia is that 
Latvia has tied her national defence tightly to Parliament. The 
government's only avenue of influence is through the National 
Defence Council, which even then is chaired by the President, 
who is also the Speaker of the Parliament. During peacetime, on 
the other hand, the Defence Forces are subordinated to the 
Defence Minister and his ministry. 
Another notable point is that, as in Estonia, the Supreme 
Commander is named only in times of war. These arrangements 
are probably aimed at guaranteeing the implementation of 
national defence in all political circumstances conceivable. 
In addition to having common threat scenarios, Estonia 
and Latvia both place emphasis on the concept of territorial 
defence. Peacetime armies will remain small in both countries, 
which canadd trained reserves only at the rate of some thousands 
of men annually. Local defence is therefore in the hands of local 
civil guards whose professional capabilities are modest owing to 
inadequate training. Nevertheless, the readiness to carry out a 
territorial defence is an ingredient difficult for an adversary to 
calculate, and serves to raise the invasion threshold. 
In 1992, a mere USD 2.41 per capita was spent on defence 
purposes (PAVLOVSKIS 1992, 4), and even then a considerable 
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portion of the funds had to be used to restore the barracks 
destroyed by the Russians during their withdrawal. It seems 
quite clear that the economic situation in Latvia will not improve 
markedly in the near future and the economic means to enhance 
the real defence capability will remain at a modest level for a 
considerable time to come. 
6 LITHUANIA: LAND OF THE CROSS 
AND HOLY POSTS 
The Republic of Lithuania is an industrialized agricultural country 
with a land and freshwater area of 65 200 square kilometres. This 
makes it a little bit larger than Belgium and Denmark. The total 
length of Lithuania's land borders is some 1747 kilometres. In 
the north, the 610-kilometre frontier with Latvia follows the 
historical border of Kurzeme. To the east and south, the 727 
kilometre-long border with Belarus runs along the Baltic uplands. 
(TBS 1991,175) 
In the southwest, Lithuania shares a border of 110 kilometres 
with Poland and one of 303 kilometres with the Königsberg/ 
Kaliningrad administrative region, which since 1945 has belonged 
to Russia. This border follows the ancient eastern border of East 
Prussia, running along the Nemunas River down to the coast of 
the Baltic Sea. The length of Lithuania's seashore is only 99 
kilometres. (TBS 1991, 175) 
In March 1939, Lithuania was forced to cede the Klaipeda 
[Memel] area north of the Nemunas, and her only port, to 
Germany (TBS 1991, 180). In October of the same year, the Soviet 
Union returned to Lithuania her ancient capital Vilnius and some 
6800 square kilometres of adjacent areas. One year later some 
strips of ancient Belarus soil were annexed to the northeastern, 
southeastern and southwestern parts of the Vilnius area. 
(MYLLYNIEMI 1977, 84; MISIUNAS & TAAGEPERA 1983, xvi; 
OMZ 4/1990, 335) 
MAP 8: Lithuania. 
During the campaign for Lithuania's re-independence in 1990, 
the Brezhnevite leadership of Belarus announced that "...in case 
Lithuania gains re-independence, Belarus shall claim the returning 
of Vilnus and six rural areas...." (BINYON 1990). It is thus possible, 
though not probable, that the Vilnius area might lead to disputes 
between Lithuania and Belarus in the future. Poland and 
Lithuania, on the other hand, have announced that they will 
respect their present borders and lay no territorial claims. (AN 
4.11.1992, 2; GRÖNHOLM 1993a) 
Industrialized Farmland 
Dominating Lithuania's short seacoast is the Pajuria lowland, 
only 15 to 20 kilometres wide and with a mean elevation of less 
than 50 metres above sea-level. East of the lowland lies the 
Zemaiciu [Samgitian] upland, which attains its highest point of 
234 metres at Medvegalis. The central Lithuanian lowland, 
stretching as much as 100 kilometres from west to east, and lying 
about 35-90 metres above sea-level, commands the middle part 
of the country, north of Kaunas. (TBS 1991, 175) 
The eastern and southern parts of Lithuania form part of 
the Baltic elevation, rising up to 282 metres above sea-level and 
bounded in the southeast by a sandy plateau. In the east are the 
Svencioniu and Medininku ridges, part of the Lithuanian-Belarus 
upland, whose highest point of 294 metres is Mt. Juozapine. (TBS 
1991, 175) 
There may be oil in the sea-bed of Lithuania's territorial 
waters and in the western part of the country, while iron ore and 
granite are found in the southeast. Limestone, quartz sand, 
dolomite, gypsum and gravel are other important minerals (TBS 
1991, 176). An installation for producing unleaded gasoline was 
allegedly under construction in the oil refinery in Mazekiai in 
1992. (KUBU 1992c) 
Only some 28 per cent of the territory is wooded, 38 per 
cent of the trees being pine, 21 per cent spruce and 21 per cent 
birch. The most extensive woodlands are in the southwestern 
part of the country. The central lowland has the most fertile 
farmland in Lithuania. (TBS 1991, 176) 
The 2833 lakes larger than half a hectare and the 1600 
smaller lakes cover only some 1.5 per cent of the country. Most of 
the lakes lie in the northern part of the Baltic elevation, on the 
Aukstaiciu upland. The overall length of Lithuanian's 29 900 
rivers is 63 700 kilometres; 758 of these rivers are longer than 10 
kilometres, the longest being the Nemunas [937 km], Neris [510 
km], Venta [350 km] and Sesupe [298 km]. (TBS 1991,175) 
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The prevailing winds are from the west and the weather 
conditions are a mixture of coastal and continental climate. Mean 
temperatures are -4.9 C in January, +17 C in July and +6.1 C 
over the whole year. Average precipitation varies from 540 mm 
on the central lowland to 930 mm on the Zemaiciu upland. 
Annual statistics report 40-100 foggy days and 15-30 days with 
thunderstorms. (TBS 1991, 176) 
Lithuania's largest city is her capital city of Vilnius where 
some 592 500 people lived in 1989. Other cities are Kaunas [430 
000], Klaipeda [206 0001, Siauliai [148 0001 and Panevezys [129 
0001. (TBS 1991, 176) 
Transit Routes 
Lithuania's main thoroughfares are the Vilnius-Kaunas-Raseiniai-
Klaipeda, Kaunas-Jurbarkas-Klaipeda, Riga-Panevesys-Ukmerge-
Vilnius, Riga-Siauliai-Tilsit and Daugavpils-Kaunas-Königsberg 
highways. The Riga-Panevesys-Kaunas-Marijampole road forms 
the southernmost section of the Via Baltica. The west-east 
thoroughfares to and from the Kaliningrad region are strategically 
important to Russia. Some 13 larger roads run into Lithuania 
from Latvia, 16 from Belarus, four from Poland and eight from 
the Kaliningrad region. Main roads are usually in good condition, 
while the state of smaller roads varies widely. 
The railway gauge is 1524 mm and the overall length of the 
railways some 2000 kilometres. The Moscow-Minsk-Vilnius-
Kaunas-Königsberg and St. Petersburg-Vilnius-Warsaw railways 
are of strategic importance. The major interstate railways are 
Daugavpils-Panevesys-Siauliai-Klaipeda, Vilnius-Kaunas-
Siauliai-Klaipeda, and Vilnius-Kaunas-Siauliai-Riga. Swieciany-
Vilnius, Vilnius-Kaunas and the Lithuanian section of the Vilnius-
Warsaw railroad are double tracked. 
A new oil terminal was under construction in 1992 at 
Klaipeda, Lithuania's only strategically and economically 
important port (KUBU 1992c). The Soviet Baltic Navy once used 
it as its Coast Guard base (VIDRIUSKAS 1991). The coast around 
Palanga is suitable for landing craft (ETELA-ITAMERI 1981), but 
there are no harbours. (VASILIAUSKAS 1993b) 
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Latvia's largest airport is in Vilnius, with others in Kaunas, 
Palanga and Siauliai (TBS 1991, 186). Besides these, the Soviet 
Air Force had bases in Kedainiai, Panevesys (OB 1992, 7-8) and 
probably even in Marjampole and Karmelava. Soviet Air Defence 
Forces were also garrisoned in Mickunai and Alytus. (BANKS 
1992b) 
Lithuania was linked up with the international 
telecommunications network through a digital exchange in 
August 1992 (HS 27.8.1992, Cl). This allowed direct satellite 
telephone calls at least to Copenhagen (VASILIAUSKAS 1993b) 
and Norway (GEUST 1992). The new telephone exchange was a 
joint project of the Lithuanian Telephone Company and the 
American U.S. West Company (TS 27.8.1992, 11). Telephone 
connections to CIS countries still go via Moscow. 
Kurisches Haff 
Lithuania's southwestern coast is part of the Kurisches Haff, 
which is a long shallow lagoon separated from the open sea by a 
sandspit, Kurische Nehrung. The depth of the lagoon varies 
from 0.5 metres in the north to 5 metres in the south. To the west 
of the Kurishe Nehrung the waters are only 2-7 metres deep, but 
about one kilometre from the shore the sea-bed drops down to 
16-18 metres. (KAUNAS 1978; ETELÄ-ITÄMERI 1981) 
Kurische Nehrung itself is 2 to 3 kilometres broad, stretching 
from Zelenogradsk in the Kaliningrad region to off Klaipeda. A 
road runs along the spit, and sea defences have been built on the 
western coast of the Lithuanian section (ETELA-ITAMERI 1981; 
KAUNAS 1978). Sea defences may be effective against an enemy 
using that part of the spit for landing operations. Alternatively, 
Kurisches Nehrung can be used as an axis of advance and the 
Kurisches Haff for amphibious operations with hovercraft. 
There are no capes or islands along the 40 kilometres of 
coast between Klaipeda and the Latvian border. Waters shallower 
than 10 metres stretch 1-8 kilometres out to sea and the sea-bed 
does not drop down to some 20 metres until 12 kilometres off the 
coast. 
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The Pajuria lowland is more or less open terrain across 
which a main road runs from Klaipeda to Liepaja. Three main 
roads lead inland from the coast, and from Klaipeda there are 
railway connexions to Latvia, Siauliai and Tilsit. (ETELA-
ITÄMERI 1981; KAUNAS 1978; RAVENSTEIN 1992) 
Surveillance and control of Lithuania's short and open 
coast are not a problem, even with scanty resources, but these 
activities must also be extended to the waters of Kurische Haff. 
Access to Klaipeda's harbour is also easy to block. Another coastal 
object to be defended besides Klaipeda is Palanga. With the 
openness of the coast, it could easily be defended with mobile, 
truck-mounted coastal missiles. 
Ethnically Homogeneous 
In 1989, the population of Lithuania was about 3 670 000, of 
which some 68 per cent lived in cities and towns and 47.4 per 
cent were males. The average density of population was 56 
inhabitants per square kilometre. Lithuania's birth-rate has been 
declining since 1961, and in 1989 only 55 000 births were 
registered. (TBS 176-177) 
Lithuania is ethnically fairly homogeneous. In 1989, 2.9 
million of the population [79.6 %] were Lithuanians, 0.35 million 
[9.4%] Russians, 0.258 million [7.0%] Polish and 0.063 million 
[1.7%] Belarussians. Some 90 per cent of Russian nationals lived 
in cities and towns, while the number of Polish urban residents 
was about 58 per cent, with most of them living in Vilnius. (TBS 
1991,176-177; SAARIKOSKI 1993) 
The small number of Russians reflects the policy of the 
Lithuanian government during the 1960s and 1970s not to accept 
the mammoth Soviet factories that would have brought in masses 
of Russian workers. During the campaign for re-independence, 
the political Jedintsvo movement (IL 10.1.1991, 13) sprang up 
among Russians who supported Communism and the Soviet 
Union (FT 10.9.1991, 2). The movement was joined by members 
of the Soviet KGB and OMON and allegedly gave military training 
to civilians. (HS 7.9.1991, C2) 
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About half of the ethnic Russians have lived in the country 
for centuries. By 1994, all Russian military units had been 
repatriated. Some 85 per cent of Russians have received 
Lithuanian citizenship and Russia has made no accusations of 
their nationals being mistreated (GRÖNHOLM 1993b; LINSIO 
1994b). Although a Russian pro Soviet Union Rossija society still 
exists (LINSIO 1994b), it is clear that the Russian minority will 
not cause major problems in Lithuania. 
The Polish minority, small in number and professing the 
same Roman Catholic faith (TBS 1991, 176) as Lithuanians, may 
be more of a problem. Most Poles live in the southeastern part of 
the country. The older people speak a Belarus dialect, while the 
younger ones speak Russian (TBS 1991, 176). Most of the Polish 
intelligensia moved back to Poland in the 1960's leaving the 
poorest and less educated peasants and pensioners behind. 
(RISLAKKI 1991b) 
The Polish minority has at times strained Lithuanian-Polish 
relationships (HS 29.9.1992, Cl). However, after year-long 
negotiations, Lithuania and Poland have normalized their 
relations and on 26 April 1994 agreed upon a Pact of Friendship 
and Good Neighbourliness (TS 27.4.1994, 15). The Pact is being 
heralded as opening a new, warmer era in the relations of the 
two countries. (TS 19.3.1994, 15) 
The approximately three million ethnic Lithuanians easily 
produce more than 25 000 males a year. By training 80-90 per 
cent of these, Lithuania's reserves would grow by about 20 000-
22 000 soldiers annually. Theoretically that would enable the 
country to mobilize a wartime army 300 000 strong and thereby 
establish a comprehensive territorial defence. 
Two Directions 
Because of the Russian base at Kaliningrad, Lithuania is forced 
to orient her defence planning in two different directions. The 
most important strategic objectives are the capital city of Vilnius 
and the seaport of Klaipeda, which are situated at opposite ends 
of the country and, at least in theory, could both be captured by a 
raid. The presence of Kaliningrad underscores the importance of 
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cooperation with Latvia in arranging the defence of the western 
and central parts of the two republics. 
Lithuania can be invaded in the northwest either from 
Liepaja or along the route between the Kursa and Zemaiciu 
uplands to the Pajuria lowland and along there to Klaipeda. A. 
coastal invasion could be supported by flanking operations from 
the sea. The defence of the Pajuria lowland is difficult to arrange 
because of the flat terrain and the short distance from the Latvian 
border to Klaipeda. In this direction, the defence should be based 
on the wooded areas around Palanga and the Zemaiciu upland. 
The defence against an enemy approach between the Kursa 
and Zemaiciu uplands could begin at the Venta River and its 
valley, with the main lines of defence established on the uplands. 
The Zemgale lowland offers a natural axis of advance from Riga 
towards the central Lithuanian lowland and Kaunas. Such an 
invasion woud be extremely difficult to ward off because of the 
wide open farmland in the central lowland. 
Many roads run to the lowland from Latvia, and rivers do 
not channel movement except from west to east, and even then 
only to a limited extent. The central lowland narrows in the 
south and inspection of maps suggests that, from the level of 
Siauliai-Panevesys southwars, defence could increasingly be 
based on wooded areas. 
An invasion from the northeast towards Kaunas and Vilnius 
could begin from the comparatively open central Latvian lowland. 
In this area, the good and dense road network is mainly directed 
from northeast to southwest and south. On maps, the terrain 
along the northeastern frontier is shown as wooded and with 
abundant lakes, but open from the Anyksciai-Utena level, and 
wooded again from Ukmerge southward. The River Sventoji 
would hinder an advance towards Kaunas. In the south, the 
Neris River can be assumed to have some defensive value. 
The defence of Lithuania's eastern border could be based 
on the wooded and hilly Baltic upland where also rivers running 
from southeast to northwest offer defence possibilities. The few 
roads run mainly along the upland; only from the south and 
south-southeast are there major roads running towards Vilnius. 
The Baltic upland can be regarded as an excellent area for light 
infantry and guerilla operations. 
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MAP 12: Soviet Invasion Plan of 1940. 
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not regard the Baltic upland 
as an obstacle in their invasion plan of 1940. A major attack 
would have been directed right across the upland towards Riga. 
Massive use of helicopters would nowadays make such an attack 
even easier to execute, but easy to repulse, too, with portable 
surface-to-air missiles for example. 
MAP 8: Lithuania 
A major highway runs from Suwalki in Poland via Kaunas to 
Daugavpils in Latvia. On maps, the terrain in this direction looks 
to be mostly open in the south; however, a natural basis for 
defence is offered by a discontinuous wooded zone, 30 to 40 
kilometres wide, surrounding Kaunas. Around the point where 
the borders of Poland, Lithuania and the Kaliningrad area come 
together, defence could be started in the wooded terrain in the 
north of the Suwalki upland. 
As long as the Kaliningrad area continues to house a large 
Russian military base, Lithuania must take it seriously into 
account as a potential threat. In the First World War Germany 
attacked Lithuania from Königsberg in both directions, Kybartai-
Kaunas and Jurbarkas-Panevesys. Likewise in the Second World 
War the Germans used two main directions, this time Jurbarkas-
Panevesys and the Pajuria lowland from Klaipeda northwards. 
The terrain east of the Kaliningrad region is open up to the 
woods around Kaunas. The terrain is also open and flat north of 
the Nemunas River advancing from Jurbarkas towards the 
northeast. The Pajuria lowland is equally as difficult to defend 
against attack from the south as against attack from the north. 
The Nemunas can be regarded as an obstacle of some degree. 
To repulse attacks on Lithuania from the Kaliningrad area 
would appear difficult owing to the open and flat terrain. 
However, deep territorial defence and guerilla-type operations 
might offer advantages to the defender. A territorial defence 
based on wooded areas, the uplands and abundant anti-tank and 
surface-to-air missile weaponry would, in general, seem to be a 
credible defence solution for Lithuania 
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Collective Security 
Although Lithuania regards no country as her enemy, general 
instability in the east (BANKS 1992a) and the fact that Russia still 
regards the Baltic republics as her satellites (BANKS 1992b), or 
'close foreign countries', are factors to be be reckoned with. Local 
army officers regard Lithuania as a transit area that cannot be 
defended by Lithuania alone (VIDRIUSKAS 1991; KNUUTI 
1993a). The Kaliningrad region is also considered a problem, not 
only for Lithuania but for Latvia and Estonia. (VASILIAUSKAS 
1993b) 
Lithuania, along with the other Baltic republics, is swiftly 
trying to associate herself with the European Union, NATO, 
other western cooperation arrangements and the Visegrad group 
(HS 26.3.1994, B17; TS 27.4.1994, 15). Her national defence is 
based on territorial defence and European security architecture, 
with the object of resisting the attacker as long as possible, so 
giving a signal to the outside world that Lithuania has been 
invaded. (KNUUTI 1993a) 
Lithuania and Russia signed a treaty on 29 July, 1991, in 
which Lithuania's independence and the existence of the 
Kaliningrad region were both guaranteed. At the same time 
another treaty was signed on the freedom of movement of people 
and goods to and from Kaliningrad via Lithuania. Lithuania 
even promised to deliver gas and electricity to Kaliningrad by 
means of energy imported from Russia. (FT 30.7.1991, 2) 
On 8 September, 1992, an agreement was signed with Russia 
on the repatriation of Russian troops (LIETTUA 1993) and this 
has already been implemented. As part of the agreement, 
Lithuania acquired some Russian navy vessels (TS 8.11.1992, 11) 
in exchange for building 2700 flats in Kaliningrad for Russian 
officers (HS 9.9.1992, Cl). The reason for these agreements may 
be that the Russian minority is very small in Lithuania and 
Russia badly needs guaranteed land connexions to Kaliningrad. 
Professional Stand-by Brigade 
The president of the Republic of Lithuania is vested with a 
considerable amount of power. He selects the candidate for Prime 
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Minister for approval by the Parliament and he may remove and 
appoint ministers and dissolve Parliament. The President can 
also exercise a veto to prevent or delay legislation from coming 
into force. He conducts the foreign policy of the country and is 
the Supreme Commander of the Defence Forces. (RISLAKKI 
1993a) 
National defence is conducted by the Minister of Defence 
aided by four assistant defence ministers. In spring 1993, the first 
of them was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the 
second was responsible for civil defence, the third for 
administration and finance and the fourth for maintenance 
(TORLEIF 1993). The Ministry of National Defence receives four 
per cent of the government budget and deals with issues 
concerning the armed forces, the frontier guard, civil defence 
and rescue formations. (KNUUTI 1993a) 
The Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces is the 
commander of the Army, Navy and Air Force, Frontier Guard, 
National Defence School, Voluntary Units, and a 300-person-
strong Nuclear Power Plant [Ignalina] Protection Battalion. In 
addition, he is responsible for the ordnance of the armed forces. 
(TORLEIF 1993) 
In autumn 1993, the Lithuanian Army consisted of a 2000 
strong, mainly professional Field Brigade, and a Training Brigade 
in which some conscripts got their basic military education 
(KNUUTI 1993b; VASILIAUSKAS 1993b). The Field Brigade's 
eight lightly armed battalions were deployed in provincial centres 
to serve in the event of internal disturbances (VASILIAUSKAS 
1993b). Its organization has been regarded as top heavy and it 
may be divided into two parts. (KNUUTI 1993a) 
Universal conscription applies to males 19 to 27 years old. 
So far, however, the conscription has been selective; for while the 
size of age cohorts has been 10 000 to 12 000 men, only about 
3500 were fulfilling their one-year-long national service in the 
armed forces in autumn 1993. (KNUUTI 1993a) 
Territorial Defence units and the units of the National 
Guard [SKAT] are voluntary units. Territorial Defence Units are 
composed of 19 to 35 year-old reservists. Training of these units 
was intended to take place only in infrequently held [refresher] 
exercises. It is thus likely that men conscripted into these units 
do not in fact complete their one-year tour of national service. 
The higher command of the units is composed of professional 
army officers. (VASILIAUSKAS 1993a) 
National Guard [Civil Guard /SKAT] is a 10 800-strong 
voluntary defence organization commanded by a volunteer Chief 
of Staff. The defence of the parliament building against Soviet 
OMONs executed by its members in 1991 made the organization 
quite popular. In summer 1993, some 140 members of SKAT 
Detachment no. 226 rebelled against the "Communist" security 
administration, forcing the resignation of the Minister of Defence. 
Members of SKAT also disciplined the local mafia in a way 
authorities had neither the possibility nor power to do. (KNUUTI 
1993a; 1993b) 
Some 3000 men, most of whom were conscripts, served in 
the ranks of the Frontier Guard [Border Control Service] in 1993 
(KNUUTI 1993b). Eventually the Guard is to be increased in 
strength to some 4000 men. (VASILIAUSKAS 1993a) 
The 600-man Navy acts as a Coast Guard in peacetime 
(VASILIAUSKAS 1993b). In autumn 1993 it had two Grisha-class 
corvettes and four patrol boats (KNUUTI 1993b). The seaport of 
Klaipeda was protected by surface-to-air missiles. 
(VASILIAUSKAS 1993b) 
The equipment of the 800-man Air Force [Flight Service] 
consisted of four L-39 jet trainers, two L-410 liaison planes and 
20 An-2 transporters. The control of the lower airspace was 
inadequate because only civilian radars were available. (KNUUTI 
1993a; 1993b; TORLEIF 1993) 
The Lithuanian defence budget was about USD 15 billion 
in 1993. Seventy per cent of this went to salaries, pensions, training 
and daily maintenance. Thirty per cent was allocated to defence 
material, and one third of this to equipping paramilitary forces: 
the Frontier Guard, the 'Ignalina' Battalion, and the National 
Defence School. (TORLEIF 1993) Lithuanians did not want solely 
ex-Soviet equipment and attempts have been made to acquire 
material from the West as well. (VASILIAUSKAS 1993b; BANKS 
1992a) 
Partisan Defence 
The defence doctrine of Lithuania was in the process of 
formulation at least in February 1993 (VASILIAUSKAS 1993b). 
Q: 
What seems sure is that it will not be based upon the Russian 
way of military thinking, which is regarded as unsuitable for the 
defence of a small country. Some have suggested that the national 
defence should be constructed, in one way or another, upon the 
example of the Israeli system. (BANKS 1992a) 
For the time being, military thinking is based on the 
assumption that an attacker could paralyze the C3I system of 
Lithuania's defence forces. This means that the Field Brigade 
must be able to execute independent battalion-size operations 
(TORLEIF 1993). It is further considered that Lithuanian 
conventional forces cannot defend the country against a powerful 
enemy that uses modern technology, and the defence of the 
country should instead be based on a type of partisan warfare by 
Territorial Defence units. (THE INDEPENDENT 1991) 
Voluntary units that can be mobilized within a few hours 
would first guard strategic objectives and supplement the Field 
Brigade. If the attacker could not be stopped, voluntary units 
would commence guerilla-type operations. In 1991, the old Forest 
Brethren even instructed the leadership of the defence forces in 
partisan tactics and in creating a resistant network all over the 
country. (THE INDEPENDENT 1993) 
Special Case 
Lithuania proclaimed her re-independence in 1990 and began to 
set up her armed forces one year earlier than Estonia and Latvia. 
In her favour she had some 1200 ex-Soviet Lithuanian army 
officers available (VIDRIUSKAS 1991) and many former Forest 
Brethren ready to be used as consultants in partisan tactics. Ex-
Soviet officers had, however, only been promoted up to the level 
of regimental commanders, which left their knowledge of national 
defence issues somewhat skimpy. (VASILIAUSKAS 1993b) 
Lithuania's strategic position is weaker than that of Estonia 
and Latvia, with the Kaliningrad region near by and the necessity 
to provide transit traffic. Belarus is another factor making for 
uncertainty, because of her political engagement with Russia 
and the probability that Russian troops will remain in Belarus 
until the end of the century (SKIERNIEWSKI 1992). On the other 
hand, neither Russian troops nor large Russian minorities were 
present on Lithuanian soil in 1994. 
Lithuania differs from her northern neighbours in forming, 
with Belarus and Poland, part of a strategic entity that is easily 
influenced by military developments in the Ukraine. By 1993, 
cooperation concerning Russian transit traffic to and from 
Kaliningrad had not been initiated between Lithuania and her 
neighbours. 
Lithuanians elected social democracy as their way to the 
future in 1992, and a Lithuanian ex-communist as their president 
in 1993 (TS 17.11.1992, 11; TS 27.10.1992, 14; HS 16.2.1993, Cl). 
Up until spring 1994, neither of these choices had had any evident 
negative impact on the building of Lithuanian national defence 
or security policy, rather the contrary. 
In 1992, the economy of Lithuania, based mainly on 
agriculture, was driven into deep recession (KUBU 1992c; HS 
31.10.1992, B16), but in spring 1994 it seemed already to be 
steadily recovering, and some analysts were predicting that the 
country was about to find its way toward enduring development 
(PAUL 1994). If such a trend prevails, Lithuania might also have 
the means to develop her armed forces, step by step but 
harmoniously 
7 KALININGRAD GARRISON 
At the outset of both World Wars, huge numbers of German 
troops were deployed in East Prussia. In 1915, the Eighth German 
Army consisting of one cavalry and nine infantry divisions 
invaded eastwards from the area. In June 1941, the German 
North Army Group comprising 21 infantry, three motorized and 
three tank divisions attacked from the northern parts of East 
Prussia across the Baltic states (TIPPELSKIRCH 1959, 318-319; 
VOLKMANN 1932, 48). In the heavy battles of autumn 1944 and 
winter 1945, East Prussia was conquered by overwhelming Soviet 
troops. (TIPPELSKIRCH 1960,133, Map 2) 
The area was divided in two after the war, the southern 
part being annexed to Poland, while the northern part, covering 
about 15 000 square kilometres, was re-named Kaliningrad and 
annexed as an oblast [administrative region] to the Russian 
Federation. The region quickly became a huge garrison area; 
Kaliningrad was closed to foreigners; and the port of Pillau 
[Baltijsk] was sealed off from other parts of the oblast. An effective 
ethnic purge was directed at the two million German civilians, 
after which the population was quickly Russified. (NUTT 1991; 
HELLEN 1992) 
Undulating Lowlands 
Low gently rolling hills and swampy lowlands dominate the 
landscape of the region. The largest rivers are the Niemen 
[Nemunas], forming the border with Lithuania, and the Pregel, 
which flows from east to west across the region. In 1991, the 
Kaliningrad region was home to about one million people 
representing 77 nationalities (NUPPONEN 1992a, A19), while 
the City of Kaliningrad had a population of 0.4 million (LUOMA 
1991a). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western estimates 
of the number of soldiers have varied between 120 000 and 300 
000. (LUOMA 1991b; PETERSEN et.al. 1993, 59; NOWAK 1992) 
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MAP 17: Kaliningrad. 
The northern border of the oblast runs along the Niemen River, 
which is crossed by one road bridge and one railway bridge at 
Sovetsk [Tilsit]. The northwestern and northern parts of the 
province are open and hilly. In the east the frontier first runs 
along the Shervinta River [Sesupe] and then, in the south, through 
the northwestern part of the wooded Suwalki upland. 
The frontier is laid out mainly along open terrain and is 
crossed by one railway and four main roads. The 200-kilometre-
long border with Poland does not follow any natural features but 
proceeds in an almost straight line through open terrain. Crossing 
it are a canal, three railway lines and some twenty major roads. 
(KALININGRAD 1978) 
Forests grow mainly in the northeastern and southeastern 
parts of the oblast as well as on the northwest coast, from where 
a wooded zone stretches south around Kaliningrad and 
Tshernjahovsk. The highest points of the region lie in the Suwalki 
upland in the southeast and in the Natangen upland in the 
southwest. Elsewhere the land is broken and hilly and rivers 
abound. (KALININGRAD 1978) 
The railway and road connections to Russia run via Vilna-
Smolensk, Vilna-Daugavpils and Klaipeda-Riga-Pskov. The most 
important inland traffic routes are the road and railroad 
connections from Kaliningrad to Sovetsk, Kybartai and Baltijsk. 
Sovetsk is also connected with Tshernjahovsk by a railway. A 
channel has been dug from the Niemen River to the southeastern 
part of Kurisches Haff lagoon, where a water route opens along 
the Deima and Pregel rivers and the Masuria Canal to the Masuria 
Lake area in Poland. (KALININGRAD 1978) 
The shallow waters, only 2 to 4 metres deep, at the southern 
end of the Kurisches Haff, form the northwest coast of the oblast. 
West of Kurische Nehrung, the sandspit that separates the lagoon 
from the open sea, the sea-bed quickly descends to more than 16 
metres. A road runs along the Kurische Nehrung, but there are 
no harbours. (KALININGRAD 1978) 
A railway runs around the Samland Peninsula in the west. 
The port of Pionerskij lies on the north coast, and that of Svetlin 
on the south coast of the Peninsula. The port and naval base of 
Baltijsk command the southern end of the sand spit extending 
southwest from the Samland Peninsula. (KALININGRAD 1978) 
The northern part of the Frisches Haff, whose waters are 
no more than a few metres deep, forms the southwestern coast of 
the province. The lagoon is separated from the Baltic sea by the 
Frische Nehrung sandspit, some kilometres west of which the 
seabed descends to 50 metres. A narrow passage leading from 
the lagoon to the open sea goes between the two spits 
(KALININGRAD 1978). The coastal waters of the Kaliningrad 
oblast are ice-free all year round (HELLEN 1992) but also polluted. 
(TIMONEN 1993) 
Oil and Amber 
The Kaliningrad region posesses rich natural resources. In 1992, 
about one million tonnes of crude oil was allegedly pumped 
from its soil (HELLEN 1992) and plans called for production to 
be extended out to sea. 
The region also exported amber and agricultural products, 
and fish in amounts representing about one tenth of the Soviet 
Union's total catch. The surplus of agricultural products, 
consisting mainly of meat, dairy products, eggs and vegetables, 
was exported to St. Petersburg and Moscow markets. Also the 
timber resources are economically significant. (NUPPONEN 
1992a, A20-21) 
In autumn 1992, most industrial machinery was of pre-war 
vintage (HELLEN 1992). Some 30 per cent of the main industrial 
products - pulp, paper and vodka - were exported to East-
European countries. The oblast imported 80 per cent of its 
electricity from Lithuania, but self-sufficiency will be much 
enhanced by a new 540 MW power plant running on Siberian 
gas. Electricity needs for the future are estimated at 800-1000 
MW. (NUPPONEN 1992a, A4, A20-21) 
Kaliningrad oblast was not a major investment target after 
the war since the region was probably meant to be used as a 
medium of exchange for the final neutralization of Germany. 
Because of the exceptionally high standard of living the oblast 
has lately been regarded as Russia's Western Europe. 
The younger, enterprising-minded generation would like 
to make the region a free-trade zone after the manner of Hong 
Kong. Cheap labour and energy might allure foreign investors if 
free repatriation of profits and full rights of ownership were 
granted. On the other hand, military concentrations, lack of hotels 
and the primitive level of roads and other infrastructure will 
certainly give pause to serious foreign investment. (HELLEN 
1992) 
Attack Columns 
During the Soviet era, the 11th Guards Army was stationed in 
the oblast, with its headquarters, signal regiment, one tank 
division, one motorized infantry division and two artillery 
divisions garrisoned in Kaliningrad. One tank division was 
deployed in Sovetsk and one motorized infantry division in 
Gusev. (TMBINE 1991-1992,17, 33) 
The Headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, one marine 
brigade and a naval spetsnaz brigade were in Kaliningrad, and 
large numbers of warships were based in its harbours and 
warplanes on its air bases. (TMBINE 1991-1992,17, 33) 
The 11th Army was regarded as the second or third echelon 
of the Group of Forces meant to launch an attack on the 
approaches to the Baltic and on southern Norway (TMBINE 
1989-1990,17-18). Their second mission was anticipated to be an 
amphibious operation in southern Sweden. (TMBINE 1990-1991, 
18) 
After the repatriation of Soviet and Russian forces from 
Germany, Poland and the Baltic republics, the forces stationed in 
Kaliningrad are no longer regarded as capable of such aggressive 
operations without considerable reinforcements. (TMBINE 1991-
1992, 17) 
Numerous Russian forces entered, and left, the Kaliningrad 
area in 1992 and 1993. The troops of the 11th Army were still 
there in late 1992, and at least a signal battalion and two anti-
tank artillery regiments were stationed in Kaliningrad; a 
reconnaissance battalion, a detached tank battalion and an anti-
aircraft artillery regiment in Gusev; and an engineer battalion in 
Mamovo. (PETERSEN et al. 1993, 61) 
Besides that, an air mobile brigade was garrisoned in 
Tshernjahovsk and a helicopter regiment in Kaliningrad. The 
Russian Air Forces used Lugovoje, Tshernjahovsk, Shalovsk and 
Nivenskoje as their bases. (PETERSEN et al. 1993, 61) 
Surveillance and Supply Base 
The 11th Army may be diminished to the size of an Army Corps 
(Pavel GRATSHEV/ JVD, 1.8.1992, 6) and its divisions to brigades 
in Russia's efforts to reduce her armed forces. As all Russian 
troops seem to be in a continuous state of change at the moment, 
it is impossible to estimate their final number, nature and tasks. 
In any event, the troops and their equipment garrisoned in 
Kaliningrad oblast form a potential threat at least to Lithuania 
and Poland. 
Strategically, however, Kaliningrad oblast is no longer an 
assembly area for strategic reserves or amphibious units but a 
forward naval, air and surveillance base. The Baltic Sea is only 
300 kilometres wide at Baltijsk, which allows easy surveillance of 
the sea and air traffic of its southern parts, and cutting off of this 
in times of crisis. With the ground, naval and air forces, marines, 
spetsnaz units and missiles in the oblast, it is also possible in 
theory to exercise an effect on Poland, Germany, Sweden and the 
Baltic republics. 
The ports of Kaliningrad and Baltijsk are of utmost 
importance to the Russian Baltic Fleet, though this has decreased 
in size dramatically, and will continue to do so (HS 3.3.1993, Cl; 
TS 3.3. 1993, 17). After Tallinn, Paldiski, Riga, Ventspils, Liepaja 
and Klaipeda naval bases were handed back to their real owners, 
the Kaliningrad oblast and the bottom of the Gulf of Finland 
remained the only base for the Baltic Fleet. 
The end of the Gulf of Finland can easily be blocked, for 
instance at the level of Porkkala-Tallinn. None of its harbours - 
Vyborg, Primorsk, St. Petersburg or Kronstadt - have enough 
naval capacity without extensive new construction. So long as 
Russia remains economically weak, it is more than probable that 
the main strike capacity of the Baltic Fleet will be based in 
Kaliningrad and Baltijsk harbours. 
Both harbours also possess considerable ship-building and 
dock capacity. For instance, IVAN ROGOV-class amphibious 
ships and misile boats of UDALOJ class have been built in 
Kaliningrad's Schichau shipyard (NIELSEN 1991,13). Plans also 
call for the harbour capacity of the oblast to be increased (HS 
19.9.1991, C2). Because of Kaliningrad's location, nevertheless, it 
is strategically a vulnerable forward base, and useful more in 
peacetime than wartime. 
Splendid Future Behind 
By 1993, the proprietary rights of Kaliningrad oblast had not 
been questioned in the west. Lithuania, Poland and Germany 
have officially announced that they have no claims on East Prussia 
or Kaliningrad. Poland has neither historical nor legal right to 
the region, and if the area were to be handed over to Germany, a 
new Polish Corridor, with all its problems, would be established. 
Germany also legally abandoned all her claims to the area in an 
agreement signed in Moscow in 1970. (PETERSEN et.al. 1993, 62) 
Some historical argument, dating back to the 13th century, 
exists for the annexation of the Kaliningrad region to Lithuania 
as the county of 'Karaliaucius Tvankste'. Although some maps 
drawn in Vilnius show the area with place-names written in 
Lithuanian, annexation can be regarded only as a hypothetical 
possibility. Lithuania has neither the economic means to re-build 
Kaliningrad nor the strength of population needed to absorb the 
hundreds of thousands of Russians who would certainly remain 
in the area. 
In theory, the province could be forced to proclaim 
independence, as was the case of Belgium in 1830, Austria in 
1918 and Egypt in 1922 (NUTT 1991). This alternative is hardly 
realistic, however, since the region does not have an indigenous 
population. The Prussians were absorbed by the Germans by the 
year 1500 and the Germans were replaced by Russians only 
some 50 years ago. 
Russia's attitude towards the future of her oblast is quite 
uncomplicated. Foreign Minister Andrei KOZYREV, for instance, 
addressing seamen in Baltijsk on 15 March, 1993, stated that a 
continuous and effective Russian presence in Kaliningrad is 
absolutely essential for Moscow. He also characterized the oblast 
as the cornerstone of the Russian military and economic interest 
in the Baltic region. (HS 16.3.1993, C3) 
It would appear therefore that Russia will not give up her 
Kaliningrad oblast or its military bases, at least not in the 
forseeable future. How long the forseeable future is remains to 
be seen. 
8 THREE SCENARIOS 
Once all Russian troops have left the Baltic republics, the expected 
slow development of their own defence capacity will leave the 
region a de facto military vacuum, possibly even for some decades. 
As long as no major political, economic or military tensions exist 
between Russia and the West, this state of affairs will certanly 
not have any negative impact on the peaceful and cooperative 
countries of the Baltic Basin. 
However, soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, certain 
threat scenarios regarding the Baltic region were published both 
in the United States and in Russia. The underlying motives for 
the advancement of these scenarios are difficult to discover, but 
the mere issuing of them shows that the Baltic republics have 
already been subjected to a keen and wide outside military 
scrutiny and speculation. The scenarios and the conclusions 
drawn from them are thus of interest to other Baltic Basin states 
as well. 
Invasion of Poland 
In late 1991 the U.S. Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff outlined seven different threat scenarios for various corners 
of the world, describing situations in which the U.S. armed forces 
might get involved in real action in the next ten years. These 
scenarios are also to be utilized in planning the future organization 
of the U.S. armed forces and budgeting for them. (TYLER 1992a, 
1, 4; TYLER 1992b) 
The seventh scenario dealt with a major attack launched on 
Western Europe along the southern rim of the Baltic region. The 
situation is initiated when an imperialistic and authoritarian 
government gets into power in Russia and begins pressing former 
Soviet republics, alleging as a pretext that the rights of Russian 
minorities are being oppressed. Finally, the Russian government 
insists on autonomy for the Russian minorities living in Belarus, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (TYLER 1992b) 
A period of accelerating tension lasts for six to eight months, 
after which 18 Russian and six Belarus divisions cross the 
Lithuanian border continuing their attack along the Polish-
Lithuanian frontier. Lithuania asks NATO for help and NATO 
sends 5000 Rapid Reaction Force soldiers to Western Poland. 
NATO also conducts a 30-day partial mobilization in which it 
establishes 18 divisions and 66 tactical air wings. (TYLER 1992b) 
The scenario presupposes that the United States puts more 
than seven army divisions, 45 tactical air wings, four heavy 
bomber wings, six carrier groups and one marine division at 
NATO's disposal. Further, planning is based on a calculation 
that it takes some 90 days before a NATO mobilization force has 
been assembled and readied for action. (TYLER 1992b) 
NATO Infiltration 
A scenario put forth by Commodore A. DEMTSHENKO in 1992 
reflects the strategic viewpoints and fears of Russian officers. It 
starts from the assumption that Russian troops will all be 
repatriated from the Baltic republics and the Baltic Fleet will be 
pushed forward to the harbours of Kaliningrad oblast and 
crammed into the harbours at the eastern end of the Gulf of 
Finland. NATO seizes the opportunity and increases its influence 
and presence in the Baltic Sea and the Baltic republics. 
(DEMTSHENKO 1992) 
According to this scenario, NATO has already made plans 
to place Baltic naval bases, harbours and airports at its disposal. 
These would be formed into a forward base area for NATO's 
naval and air forces belonging to the Rapid Reaction Forces of its 
Allied Forces Europe [AFNORTH]. DEMTSHENKO also alleges 
that the decision to establish special Rapid Reaction Forces in the 
Baltic Sea was made as early as 1991. (DEMTSHENKO 1992) 
Further it is assumed that NATO will establish a Standing 
Naval Force [SNF] in the Baltic Sea, composed of Strike Force, 
Mine Warfare Force, Anti Submarine Force and Light Force. Its 
main base would be the Gdynia naval base, while Lithuanian, 
Latvian and Estonian harbours would serve as replenishment 
and forward bases for SNF vessels. (DEMTSHENKO 1992) 
From 1994 on, NATO would begin to place C3I containers 
in Latvia and Estonia, making it possible to deploy NATO's 
standing operational combined arms force in the republics. The 
air defence system of the Baltic republics would later form the 
basis for NATO's air defence in this direction. (DEMTSHENKO 
1992) 
DEMTSHENKO further supposes that NATO wishes to 
store supplies and equipment in the republics, enabling it to 
maintain its forward forces and to reconnoitre CIS countries. 
Finally, he argues that the Baltic republics will be attached to 
NATO's sphere of activities by 1994-1995 when the repatriation 
of Russian troops will be complete. (DEMTSHENKO 1992) 
Long Arin 
The American scenario contains some interesting ingredients, on 
the basis of which conclusions can be drawn on the alternatives 
for long-term strategic development in the Baltic Basin. 
Russia and Belarus are firstly presupposed to be pursuing 
a common military policy and acting together. Secondly, the 
United States is not offering a helping hand to Lithuania but to 
Poland, and the scenario bears only on Lithuania and Poland, 
not the other Baltic republics. A third point of interest is the 
calculation that NATO's mobilzation will be slow and the forces 
will be ready for action only after some delay. 
One conclusion that can be drawn from this scenario is that 
neither the United States nor NATO regard themselves as either 
willing or able to defend the Baltic republics in the event of a 
Russian attack. Yet another notable point is that NATO would, 
however, be prepared to send its troops to Poland, this 
underscoring the importance of Poland as Germany's eastern 
defence zone. 
The U.S. scenario suggests two different patterns of strategic 
development for the Baltic Basin, neither excluding the other. 
The Baltic republics could be connected with the European 
security and defence arrangements by using Poland as a dummy. 
This arrangement would resemble the policy that was pursued 
in the 1920's, albeit in vain. 
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The second alternative supposes that Finland, Sweden, 
Norway and Denmark later on develop some common sub-
regional defence cooperation, probably within the framework of 
WEU and NATO. This alternative could contain a provision for 
these Scandinavian countries to give military aid to Estonia and 
Latvia, while the United States helped Poland. 
Dread and Paranoia 
Commodore A. DEMTSHENKO's scenario is by no means just a 
personal view. Dr. Vitali TSYGICHKO (1991) and Minister Raivo 
VARE (1992a), for instance, have stated that at least the 
conservative officers of CIS' General Headquarters regard the 
lowered level of military confrontation as a temporary 
phenomenon only. Both men consider that the conservative 
officers in particular expect a situation similar to the Cold War to 
return in 15 years. 
At root, DEMTSHENKO's scenario reflects Russia's need 
for free access to the Baltic Sea and the fear of this possibility 
being denied. Feeding the fear is the awareness that Russian 
military might has been diminished in general and especially in 
the Baltic Basin. In emphasizing that Lithuania is important to 
NATO, DEMTSHENKO indirectly refers to the significance of 
Lithuania's road and railway connections to Russia. 
Paranoiac, however, are the schedules DEMTSHENKO has 
outlined for NATO expansion. The only signals of NATO's 
interest in the Baltic republics by 1993 have been the enlargement 
of its area of responsibility to the Baltic Sea, a naval visit to 
Tallinn in 1992, and the BALTOPS-93 naval exercise, in which 
also Russian naval forces took part. 
DEMTSHENKO's scenario is further paranoiac in the 
anticipation of NATO as an aggressive military alliance. The 
Alliance has swiftly diminished its stand-by military force. Its 
policy, moreover, has been extremely restrained regarding the 
civil war in the former Jugoslavia and the crises in the former 
Soviet Union. This restraint might be influenced by the strategic 
nuclear arsenal Russia still has ready at her disposal. 
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In this respect, any expansiveness of NATO could be 
expected to occur at the earliest after the START II agreement has 
been fully implemented. The mere complete repatriation of 
Russian forces from Estonia and Latvia would hardly act as a 
tripwire to a process of expansion as described in the Russian 
scenario. 
In Two Days 
The American and Russian scenarios are, quite frankly, rich in 
perspicuity but largely imaginative, and focus on developments 
in the long run. A more comprehensive threat scenario that 
might be implemented the moment an imperialistic government 
gets hold of power in Russia has been outlined by the Balts 
themselves. 
In this scenario, if Russia were to attack the Baltic republics, 
it would attack all of them at once, from the east and the 
southwest. In such an onslaught the troops of Kaliningrad oblast 
would be used first; and while their use would be only a signal 
and a political manoeuvre to the West, it would be a question of 
life and death to the Baltic republics. (KNUUTI 1993a) 
The tank division garrisoned in Sovetsk, for instance, could 
reach Riga in ten hours. Klaipeda, Liepaja and Ventspils could be 
captured and the Baltic coast of the Baltic Sea sealed off by raids 
of airborne battalions. Lithuania could be taken with a mere two 
divisions from Kaliningrad, one being directed to Vilnius and 
the other to Kaunas. (KNUUTI 1993a) 
Signal intelligence has picked up new units being placed in 
Ingermanland east of Estonia, and the Leningrad Military District 
has received other new troops. In addition to these, the airborne 
division garrisoned in Pskov could be used in Estonia. Thus, all 
the Baltic republics could be conquered in two days. (KNUUTI 
1993a) 
This threat scenario was the framework for the staff exercise 
held by the Russian Northwestern Group of Forces in Estonia 
and Latvia in April 1993. 
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